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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis examines the effectiveness of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
in holding individuals accountable for grave breaches of crimes against peace, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. I argue that if we measure effectiveness 
in terms of the ability to set agenda and to publicize, the ICC accomplishes much. My 
thesis to shows that, as a key part of the international agenda on human rights 
compliance, the ICC derives its effectiveness from the various naming and shaming 
campaigns by national governments and non-governmental actors (NGOs).  
I draw on the cases of Darfur, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to show 
that the ICC is effectively realizing its purpose: it gives voice to non-state actors like 
NGOs, regional actors, and international governmental organizations; it regularizes ways 
for international actors to be part of the process; it provides information to other 
stakeholders; and it names and shames the perpetrators of human rights violations. 
Hence, the ICC gives meaning to the cautious optimism that inspires liberal claims. 
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PART I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The international community increasingly seeks to hold individuals accountable for grave 
breaches of crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. There are 
different solutions that range from the codification of international human rights and 
humanitarian law treaties to engagement in an internationally agreed mechanism to punish the 
perpetrators. Nevertheless, they share a common search for standards of compliance.  
 Though national courts can be the most effective mechanisms for prosecuting such 
violations, international institutions also matter and are effective in their own right. I argue that, 
if we think of effectiveness as agenda setting and publicity, much is accomplished at the 
international level. This is especially so if we take a longer view. The international commitment 
to punish serious human rights violators has moved from ad hoc tribunals to more regularized 
forums. A recent example is the International Criminal Court (ICC). The establishment of the 
ICC is an important part of this growing commitment and in its short history its contribution is 
significant. My purpose in this thesis is to show that, as a key part of the international agenda on 
human rights compliance, the initial effectiveness of the ICC is a result of various naming and 
shaming campaigns by national governments and non-governmental actors (NGOs). The effort to 
publicize major crimes and violations gives the ICC added visibility. 
I seek to address the effectiveness of international institutions in protecting human rights 
in my thesis by examining one of the most recent and controversial of these institutions, the ICC. 
My thesis is divided into three parts. First, I specify the purpose of the ICC. Second, I show that, 
under certain conditions, the ICC is effectively realizing its purpose. Third, I argue that even at 
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this early stage in its development, the ICC gives meaning to the cautious optimism that inspires 
the liberal claim. To support my argument, I detail two cases to show that if we think of 
effectiveness as voice and shame, the ICC can be effective.  
My purpose, then, is to investigate the effectiveness of the ICC in the cases of Darfur, 
Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Both show non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), regional actors, and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) regularizing voice against 
those who commit crimes and providing information to other stakeholders as a way of building 
wider international pressure for shaming perpetrators.  
 
Realism and Liberalism 
Like much of political life, bargaining and negotiation are prevalent features of 
international politics. What makes international politics even more complicated is that actors 
(states) conduct their affairs under conditions of anarchy. Scholars of international relations 
define the concept of anarchy as follows: no entity exists above individual states with the power 
or authority to enforce the treaties, agreements, or contracts that emerge from state bargaining 
and negotiation. So, states police themselves.  
What this means for the possibility of international cooperation is the subject for some 
debate. There are two main, competing schools of thought in the field of international relations. 
One is Realism. In realism, conflict is the greater possibility and as a result realists see politically 
dangerous consequences of anarchy: 
a. As states must enforce their treaties, agreements, or contracts themselves, they create the 
means to do so. 
b. One fact of international political life is the decentralization of force among states. 
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c. When states disagree, the use of force is always a possibility. 
d. Therefore, given the uncertainty of peaceful cooperation, states fear the intentions of 
others. 
Another school of thought is Liberalism. Liberals see the building of international 
institutions as a way to alleviate the dangerous consequences of anarchy. International 
institutions provide platform for dialogue as well as opportunities for regular interaction and 
cooperation, so states have a way out of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. When every party can access 
information about each other, the conduct that made possible by the office of the secretariat or 
the high level meetings held on routine basis, the exposure to the information could also reduce 
uncertainty about others’ intentions. Then, parties are exposed to settle dispute amicably – 
through the conduct of diplomacy- rather than to the threat of military force. In short, creating 
international institutions supposedly helps to better manage the use of force. Thus, the effort to 
build institutions for liberals is an effort to make peaceful cooperation more a certainty. 
Nevertheless, empirical evidence is mixed. Even with the building of many global and 
regional institutions in international history, and especially since the ending of World War II, the 
purpose and the effectiveness of them in fostering peaceful and cooperative relations among 
states remains an open question. What realists continue to see as a false promise, liberals 
continue to see as a true possibility.  
 
Background of the Problem  
The modern history of international relations is often traced back to the Peace of 
Westphalia of 16481. In its aftermath, the world order “effectively affirmed the state as the 
                                                 
1 It denoted two peace treaties drafted during 1646-1648 and signed in Osnabrück on 
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unchallenged guarantor of domestic order and legitimizer of external war” (Howard 2001, 16). 
As a result, these peace treaties did not bring Europe peace so much as change the terms of war. 
The use of force by states grew more intense and costly, with the development of more lethal 
equipment and technologies to arm the standing forces.  
Westphalia helped to institute the legal concept of sovereignty, to encourage the rise of 
the independent nation-state and to foster the institutionalization of diplomacy and armies. As 
Mowat (1966, 13) argues, the advent of Europe becoming a nation-state, and each state 
maintaining a sovereign status, conflicts and war had become more likely to occur. To further aid 
the likeliness of conflict, there were no sovereign agents or magistrates with authority above or 
between the states. Due to this, international anarchy existed between the states. 
Since states police themselves, international political life does give rise to security 
competition. A key feature of this competition is balance of power politics, as states seek to 
offset or attain military advantages of rivals. It is a reliance on relative distributions of military 
force as a means of bargaining and negotiation. As Howard (2001) argues, balance of power 
politics produce a kind of negative peace; or simply the absence of war. The search for 
something more durable and accepted, what Howard calls a kind of positive peace, is what drives 
the building of institutions.  
The institution of war persisted as part of the international order in eighteenth-century 
Europe, mostly because of the efficacy, morality, and desirability of power. War was a necessary 
tool in the conduct and preservation of state power. States had the right, again in the name of 
                                                                                                                                                             
May 15, 1648 and in Münster on October 24, 1648, which ended the Thirty Year’s War in the 
Holy Roman Empire, and the Eight Year’s War between Spain and the Republic of the United 
Netherlands. Treaty of the Pyrenees of 1659, which ended the European wars of religion 
(Franco-Spanish War, 1635-1659) was also considered part of the Westphalia Peace Treaty. 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westphalian_peace  
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sovereignty, to go to war when they thought it necessary –a means to an end. In this practice, 
state policy was a perfectly adequate jus ad bellum. Emer de Vattel, a Swiss philosopher who laid 
the foundation of modern international law and political philosophy, challenged this just war’s 
doctrine (quoted in Howard 2001, 25). He contended that when two parties believe themselves to 
be in the right, with neither superior in authority and with no party having authority to adjudicate 
between them, the right to go to war to preserve justice and right a wrong become irrelevant. 
What mattered then was jus in bello: to conduct war in such a manner it results in the least 
damage to international society and makes the conclusion of a stable peace possible.  
Kant in enunciating the ‘perpetual peace’ argued that reform of states is taken to be the 
sine qua non of world peace. Kant defined republican states, which would voluntarily agree to be 
governed by a code of law as the standard of the good state. This type of state, where leaders are 
accountable to the people, decreases incentives for war and its casualties and lost resources. 
Further, republican states are more likely to abandon international anarchy and enter a league of 
nations to obtain collective security (Howard 2001, 30).   
Kant’s essay, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, was written in 1795. Though it 
outlined the concept of a peaceful community, the movement toward institutionalized peace 
gained its momentum after World War I, with the establishment of the League of Nations on 
January 25, 1919. Prior to this, the Concert of Europe had made every attempt to maintain the 
status quo between the European states and thus avoid war. This same period also saw the 
development of international law with the first Geneva Conventions being adopted in 1864, 
which established laws about humanitarian relief during war, and the Hague Conventions of 
1899 and 1907, which also governed rules of war, and the peaceful settlement of international 
disputes. Despite opposition toward international institutions championed by realists and other 
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skeptics, these periods obviously gave voice to liberals, who viewed such institutions as 
promising and as ways to foster cooperation under some circumstances as well as help politicize 
issues.  
However, that war is a possible outcome of state bargaining and negotiation once again 
showed relevance. The Second World War broke out on September 1, 1939 and at the time it 
ended, on September 2, 1945; some 40 out of 60 million people who had died in the war were 
civilians. The deadliest conflict in human history had made the League of Nations come to its 
end since the onset of World War II, and obviously showed that the League had failed its primary 
purpose. Not only had the war left the political alignment and social structure of the world 
significantly changed, but it also provided another basis for the second attempt of 
institutionalized peace. The United Nations Organization officially came into existence on 
October 24, 1945 upon ratification of the Atlantic Charter by the five permanent members of the 
Security Council and by the majority of the other 46 countries.  
The main victory gained by the Allied forces of World War II was the successful effort to 
try the perpetrators of peace by setting up the International Ad-Hoc Tribunal at Nuremberg2 and 
Tokyo. Following these, the international community recognized the need to establish a 
permanent international court to deal with such atrocities. The UN General Assembly delegated 
the authority to start the preparatory work to the International Law Commission. By the early 
                                                 
2 The Nuremberg Trials had a great influence on the development of international 
criminal law. The conclusions served as models for the following international covenants: The 
Genocide Convention (1948), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), The 
Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of Nurnberg Tribunal and in the 
Judgment of the Tribunal (1950), The Convention on the Abolition of the Statute of Limitations 
on War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity (1968), The Geneva Conventions on the Laws and 
Customs of War (1949), Protocol I of the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict 
and Protocol II of the Protection of Victims on Non-International Armed Conflicts. Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuremberg_Tribunal  
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1950s, however, their work was pretty much undermined by the Cold War situation. In an 
attempt to try war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, the international community 
established two other ad hoc tribunals in 1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia or ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda or ICTR.    
Ever since, the need to establish a permanent court that would be able to extend its 
jurisdiction not only during the armed conflict but also during peacetime and in war became a 
necessity. Marler (1999) enunciated the needs to establish a permanent international criminal 
court by arguing that the court is a necessary tool to help human nature making societal progress 
possible. She further argued that the first respectable international attempts to enforce 
humanitarian laws proved to be extremely inefficient. One reason for this was sessions of 
negotiations, and a preparation for tribunals that usually lasted two years, resulting in the failure 
of smaller incidents being left unaddressed, or neglected. With the realization of these issues and 
their consequences, the necessity of a permanent international court was acknowledged as an 
essential component in the enforcement of international humanitarian laws (Marler 1999, 829-
30).3 
In addition, a permanent international criminal court is necessary in order to combat 
impunity. The Inter-Parliamentary Union argued that even after the world agreed to be guided by 
the Geneva Conventions, whether in times of peace, international war, or regional conflicts, 
                                                 
3 The phenomenon is called the tribunal fatigue. Roach argued, “The development and 
application of the ICTY’s authority underscores some problems and limitations of ad hoc 
international criminal courts. First, international criminal tribunals have become costly and 
arguably inefficient. As of April 2005, the ICTY’s total operating budget had reached nearly 
$650 million. Second, the regional focus of such jurisdiction means those ad hoc international 
criminal courts can only target crimes that occur within a designated or defined territory or 
region. Lastly, it follows that the permanent members of Security Council will use their own veto 
power to block the prosecution of any of its own military personnel stationed in the area” (2006, 
31-2). 
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states’ atrocities against their own people continued to shock the conscience of human kind. The 
atrocities include war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, torture, extrajudicial 
executions, and involuntary disappearances. Such practices occurred throughout the world in the 
twentieth century, and the majority of the perpetrators have gone unpunished (IPU and OHCHR 
2005, 55).    
These circumstances culminated in the establishment of the ICC. The institution derives 
its mandate, jurisdiction, and authority to try the perpetrators of the crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and the crimes of aggression4 from the Rome Statute that was 
adopted by 120 states in 1998, and later was signed by 139 states.  
 
Legal Contours of the ICC 
To facilitate the understanding of this study and to discuss the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court in the right contexts, the following terms are defined: 
1. Rome Statute 1998, Article 6, genocide “means any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, as 
such: (a) killing members of the groups; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing 
                                                 
4 The International Criminal Court does not currently have jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression. An amendment to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which would 
grant ICC the jurisdiction over the crimes of aggression, is in the process of ratification by the 
Assembly of State Parties, the legislative body of the ICC. Under no circumstances, however, the 
ICC will be able to exercise jurisdiction over the crimes of aggression before January 1, 2017. 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court. Besides, Rome Statute 1998 
Article 5 concludes, “The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a 
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out 
the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a 
provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”  
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measures intended to prevent births within the group; and (e) forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group.”  
2. Rome Statute 1998, Article 7 Paragraph 1, crime against humanity “means any of the 
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) murder; (b) 
extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) 
imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental 
rules of international law; (f) torture; (g) rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity; (h) persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or 
other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in 
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court; (i) enforced disappearance of persons; (j) the crime of apartheid; (k) other 
inhuman acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury 
to body or to mental or physical health.” 
3. Rome Statute 1998, Article 8 Paragraph 2, “The Court should have jurisdiction in respect 
of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a 
large-scale commission of such crimes.” (See Appendix A – War Crimes under the Rome 
Statute).   
 
Purpose and Method 
My purpose is to investigate the effectiveness of the ICC in its early existence. There are 
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currently seven cases under ICC’ investigation and I selected the cases of Darfur, Sudan and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo in my thesis. I selected these two cases for the following 
reasons. The referral of Darfur’s case to the ICC was made by the United Nations Security 
Council through Resolution 1593 adopted on March 31, 2005. The referral marked the first 
referral of United Nations Security Council to the ICC.  It was the only way to deal with human 
rights atrocities in Darfur since Sudan is not a state party to the Rome Statute. Joseph Kabila, the 
incumbent president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, referred the situation in his home 
country to the ICC on April 2004.  It became the first case for the ICC. Unlike Sudan, DRC is a 
state party to the Rome Statute.  
To support my analysis, I use information in the literature and from interviews. The 
interviews were to gain experts’ insights into my indicators of ICC effectiveness. In short, the 
interviews were necessary to confirm my hypothesis about naming and shaming which is little 
noted in the literature that assesses the effectiveness of the ICC.  
For the interviews, the approval from the Institutional Review Board of the University of 
Arkansas was granted through Protocol No. 10-12-353 dated December 14, 2010 (See Appendix 
B and C for IRB Initial and Modifying Protocols). I sent questionaries’ to three people one of 
whom declined to participate in the interview. Two other interviewees, however, Professors 
Stephen M. Sheppard and Dustin N. Sharp proved helpful.  
Sheppard is a member of the graduate faculty in the University of Arkansas School of 
Law and adjunct professor in Political Science. Sharp is an Assistant Professor at the Kroc 
School of Peace Studies at the University of San Diego where he teaches courses on transitional 
justice and international human rights law and advocacy. He previously served at the U.S. 
Department of State as an attorney-adviser for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. 
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PART II 
THE DEBATE OVER INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ICC  
 
Human rights pervade much political discussion since the end of World War II; the 
misery of war was a massive affront to human dignity. Along with the devastated post-war 
situation, the international community realized the need to prevent such tragedies from recurring 
again in the future. One repercussion was a focus on the institutionalization of peace and the 
establishment of the United Nations to fulfill the promise of institutions to decrease the incidence 
of war. Unlike its predecessor, the United Nations is equipped with power to “determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” as well as the 
power to pursue military or non-military options in order to “restore international peace and 
security.”5  
At the same time, as the attempt to institutionalize peace grew bigger, the UN took the 
lead in developing an international bill of rights and some legally binding treaties, as 
summarized in table below. Today, the various international human rights treaties and 
instruments sponsored by the UN have been ratified by most countries, which have consequently 
represented the only universally recognized value system.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter – Action with Respect to Threats to the 
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, Article 39.  
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Table 2.1  
Summary of Human Rights Instruments and Treaties Sponsored by  
The United Nations 
No. Categories Description Notes on Ratification 
1 International Bill of Human Rights 
 • Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) 
Adopted on December 10, 1948  
• The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) 
Adopted on December 16, 1966; 
Entry into force on March 23, 
1976. The Human Rights 
Committee monitors compliance. 
Acquired 72 signatories 
and 167 parties (as of 
September 2011) 
• First Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 
Acquired 113 parties and 
a further 35 signatories 
(as of May 2011) 
• Second Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 
Adopted on December 15, 1989; 
Entry into force on July 11, 1991 
Acquired 73 parties (as 
of September 2011) 
• The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) 
Adopted on December 16, 1966; 
Entry into force on January 3, 
1976. UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights monitors compliance  
Acquired 160 parties (as 
of July 2011) 
• Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights  
Adopted on December 10, 2008; 
Opened for signature on 
September 24, 2009 
Would entry into force 
when ratified by 10 
parties 
2 Core Human Rights Treaties 
 • The International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
Adopted on December 21, 1965; 
Entry into force on January 4, 
1969. The Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination monitors 
compliance 
Acquired 174 parties and 
85 signatories (as of 
February 2011)  
• The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) 
Adopted on December 18, 1979; 
Entry into force on September 3, 
1981. The Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women monitors 
compliance 
187 states had ratified or 
acceded to the treaty (as 
of July 2011) 
• The Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
Adopted on December 10, 1984; 
Entry into force on June 26, 
1987. The Committee against 
Torture monitors compliance. 
Acquired 147 parties (as 
of September 2010) 
• The Convention on the Rights of 
the Child  
Adopted on November 20, 1989; 
Entry into force on September 2, 
1990 
As of November 2009, 
194 had ratified the 
convention except 
Somalia and the USA 
• The International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families 
Adopted on December 18, 1990; 
Entry into force on July 1, 2003. 
The Committee on Migrant 
Workers monitors compliance 
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However, the question regarding the effectiveness of the culture of compliance that is 
monitored by UN bodies, and the ability to constrain states’ criteria for waging war remained 
open to debates. Part of what makes the legal system work is a culture and habit of compliance 
(Sharp, 2011). Though states may recognize these value systems would they comply? In 
addition, would compliance enable the UN to provide options for non-military actions? More 
broadly, how might an international society be structured in order to achieve this coherence? 
Realism and liberalism offer different answers for these matters. To realists, institutions 
are suspect. Mearsheimer argued, “Institutions do not have significant independent effects on 
state behavior (1995, 1). To liberals, institutions matter. Keohane contended, “Institutions help 
government to overcome collective action problems by providing information and reducing the 
cost of transactions” (1984, chapter 6). As regards the impact of human rights’ treaty ratification, 
realists remain skeptical that treaty ratification would have an impact on states compliance with 
the human rights regime. Liberals disagree.  
 
Theoretical Debate over International Institutions: Realist and Liberal Perspectives 
Realists are skeptical about the prospect of meaningful international cooperation. They 
make five assumptions. First is that the international system is one of anarchy. Second is that 
states posses military capability; it is the prominent element in supporting political power. Si vis 
pacem para bellum (if you want peace, prepare for war) becomes a justification for the arms 
race. Third is that states can never be certain about the intentions of others, so no state could 
guarantee that another state will not use its military might against another. Ironically, if a state 
prepares to police itself by increasing its military might, other states become less secure. In short, 
one party’s self-policing effort would consequently diminish another state’s security.  The fourth 
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assumption is that the leitmotiv of state foreign policy is survival of the fittest. Thus states seek 
to maintain sovereignty and protect national interests. The fifth assumption is that states are 
rational actors, therefore they think strategically about how to survive in the anarchic world, and 
rely on the threat of force in order to manage power. Realists thus expect states to maintain an 
adequate power potential through balance-of-power and deterrence in order to avoid war 
(Mearsheimer 1994/1995, 10).  
In balancing power, states make rational calculations about theirs position relative to 
others in the system. As one state increase its own military capabilities, other states respond in 
kind in order to maintain their relative military positions. The goal of deterrence is to prevent the 
outbreak of war by the threat of the use of massive (nuclear) retaliation. Deterrence requires that 
information about threat must be conveyed to the opponent. Since knowing that an aggressive 
action will be countered by another party’s second-strike capability, and because destruction is 
assured for both side; this results in the opponent deciding not to resort to force and destroy its 
own society.  
According to realists, international human rights regimes would not make much 
difference in reality. For one thing, realists claim that such regimes lack an effective monitoring 
and enforcement mechanism. As realists see it, international organizations are “captured” by 
powerful states and their effectiveness relies on the states resources. Therefore, there would be 
little of any meaning that could be accomplished until great powers weigh in –that only happens 
whenever it serves their political interest. Like their pessimistic view toward the international 
systems, realists believe there would be no effect from human rights treaty ratification on the 
countries’ human rights performance.  
From a regime theory perspective, “international treaties create binding obligations on the 
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ratifying parties, which countries aspire to honor” in the spirit of pacta sunt servanda: 
agreements are to be kept and honored (Neumayer 2005, 928). Otherwise, states would not 
engage in a long process of negotiation to disobey codes of conduct rule in effect by such 
treaties. Treaty norms are usually set to a standard that states cannot immediately comply with 
because long term goals and desirable results are perceived to be accomplished through 
attempting to meet higher standards. For this reason, full compliance is neither necessary nor 
sufficient so long as overall compliance is achieved.  
Regime theory also suggests that states observe high standards in compliance, which 
would usually serve as the safeguard of treaties. It does mean that in low standard countries, the 
goal is to generate political concern, set normative goals, maintain communication among 
members, and legitimize the transfer of official development assistance in order to boost low-
standard countries’ performance of compliance. In such a relationship, economic sanctions are 
rarely used against low-standard countries, because, what matter most, is the technical assistance 
and aid for tackling insufficient compliance capacity. Through this perspective, scholars would 
cautiously remain optimistic of the effectiveness human rights treaty ratifications have on 
countries’ human rights performance knowing that the achievement of long-term desirable goals 
are safeguarded by a mechanism that relies on the political will of high standard countries.  
A transnational legal process model works as follows, “The hope at the international level 
is that over time nations would follow international law out of habit because they have in fact 
internalized the norms” (Sharp, 2011). Koh contends that transnational legal process model 
suggested about a three-step process of action through which members of epistemic human rights 
community internalize norms codified within international treaties: interaction, interpretation, 
and internalization (Koh quoted in Neumayer 2005, 929). Epistemic human rights community 
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consists of diplomats, NGO activists, academia, and individuals transnational norm 
entrepreneurs who engage in a series of interactions, in an attempt to negotiate an international 
human rights treaty, which involves the member into various stages of drafting and preparatory 
works. Later, state parties will come to an agreement on the final text to be concluded; in which 
represents the common norm they share similar comfort. Once the final text is adopted, the 
signing parties have an obligation to ratify the treaty into their national law.  
Since a change in preference is possible, the regular follow-up meetings would provide 
opportunities to persuade non-complying parties to also join the group. International normative 
pressures reinforce this possibility:   
“Both national interests and national identities are social constructs. […] They are 
ideational and ever changing and evolving, both in response to domestic factors and in 
response to international norms and ideas. States share a variety of goals and values, 
which they are socialized into by international and nongovernmental organizations. Those 
norms can change state preferences, which in turn can influence state behavior. […] In 
short, the state ‘makes’ the system and the system ‘makes’ the state” (Mingst 2008, 105).6 
 
Regular interactions can, therefore, produced share interests and expectations. In 
addition, socializing powers in the system can lead states to further accept and value the 
standards in international norms as right or correct, or as an alternative to bearing the cost of 
non-conformity; such as dissonance and shunning.  
Liberal thinkers often use the European Union (EU) as an example of states’ ability and 
willingness to coexist in a community and as an example of state willingness to weight the rule 
of law.7 In just half a century of existence, the EU has achieved remarkable things; it has 
                                                 
6  For more information, see Martha Finnemore’s National Interest in International 
Society, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). For an insightful theoretical explanation of 
constructivism, see chapter one.   
7 O’Neil argued, “The European Union came on the heels of a devastating wars between 
these countries that left millions dead. It was in fact the divisions in Europe that served as the 
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delivered peace between its members, prosperity for its citizens, created a single European 
currency that is used by 17 out of 27 member states and a frontier-free single market where 
goods, people, services and capital move around freely. Since its founding, the EU has grown 
from six to twenty seven countries, and due to its growth, it has become a major trading power, 
as well as a world leader in fields such as environmental protection and official development 
assistance (ODA). The success of the EU is the result of its unique nature and the way it 
functions.  
While the countries that make up the EU remain independent sovereign nations, they pool 
their sovereignty for the purpose of gaining strength and world influence, which none of them 
could have obtained on their own. In practice, this means that the member states delegate some 
of their decision-making powers to the European institutions they have created.  One purpose is 
for decisions on matters of joint interest to be made democratically at a European level.  
Today, the EU is evidence in support of liberal views on the possibility of change in 
international political life as a result of constant incremental steps and the involvement of new 
actors and the forging of new relationships. These new relationships are sometimes driven 
economic interdependence. More generally, for liberals, countries increasingly observe the need 
to conduct trade, exchange goods and services, converge with the gaining of mutual 
understanding, and set democracy as the standard for conducting government affairs, in an 
attempt to avoid war in the future. 
Understanding the prominent aspect of politics and law within international relations, 
                                                                                                                                                             
catalyst for integration. In the aftermath of World War II, a number of European leaders argued 
that the repeated conflicts in the region were caused by a lack of interconnection between the 
countries themselves, which in turn fostered insecurity, inequality, and nationalism. These 
leaders believed that if their countries could be bound together through economic, societal, and 
political institutions, they would reject war against each other as an irrational act” (2010, 177-
78).  
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liberals remain optimistic of the positive consequences that result from international human 
rights regimes within political democracies, and where the rule of law prevails. Glen and Murgo 
(2003) supported this argument quantitatively when they analyzed whether human rights treaty8 
ratifications had a positive correlation with improvement of global human rights records, and 
whether observed improvements within a country’s human rights record correlated with recent 
human rights treaty ratifications.  
Neumayer (2005) also supported the liberal argument quantitatively. He studied whether 
international human rights treaties9 made a real impact by relating ratification to improved 
respect for human rights. He suggested that human rights treaties often improved respect for 
human rights, which are dependent on the extent of democracy and the strength of civil society. 
The theory of transnational human rights advocacy network argued that improvement in human 
rights performance is only possible in countries where “a cross-border collective action created 
to promote compliance with universally accepted norms” are strong (Schmitz ____, 1). Such a 
network consists of domestic NGOs and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) with linkages to 
human rights organizations at the international level (Amnesty International, Human Rights 
                                                 
8 The study examined the following human rights treaties: International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 
International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child. 
9 The study examined the following universal and regional human rights treaties: 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; First Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Article 21 and 22 of the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; American 
Convention on Human Rights; Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture; and 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.  
 19 
Watch, International Crisis Group, Global Witness, etc.), and parties and media committed to 
human rights. Improvement in human rights is a five-step process through which the human 
rights violating government moved from empty promises (unconstrained repression) to 
compliance (rule-consistent behavior), having undergone a period of denial, tactical concessions, 
and prescriptive status (Neumayer 2005, 930; Schmitz ____, 11). 
At first, opposing-domestic civil society organization is lacking the influence to constrain 
human rights violations committed by the state and its repressive apparatus, so the country could 
manage to escape the spotlight easily and commit more violations. However, the accumulation of 
gross human rights violations condoned by the regime pull the trigger off, thus forcing the 
domestic movement to appeal to their international counterpart to put the regime on the spotlight; 
disseminating information about the violations, shaming the offending regime, generating 
international public outrage against it and persuading stronger powers to target the country with 
open criticism and policy measures (Neumayer 2005, 930-31).  
The targeted-regime often reacts with denial and oppresses political activists; cracks 
down their movements, imprisons the political activists, performs summary execution, 
involuntary disappearances or torture, while at the same time denouncing the universality of 
human rights and calling the criticism as infringement of sovereignty. This is a very critical stage 
as domestic political movements lose their supporters and recruitment becomes much more 
difficult once the regime starts using terrors on its own people to counteract the demand for 
reform. The only hope left is with the advocacy networks at the international level to maintain 
the pressure until the regime starts to make some tactical concessions. Often, the regime 
underestimates the concessions they offer to diffuse criticism. The release of political prisoners, 
the lifting of some restrictions on civil liberties, as well as the withdrawal of some of the worst 
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human rights violations would indeed strengthen the domestic political movements to push for 
more.  
Once it makes tactical concessions, the offending regime has little leeway to deny the 
validity of human rights in principle. The human rights improvements would stop being ad hoc 
and the ratification of human rights treaties would lead to legal or even constitutional changes, 
thus acquired its prescriptive status. Later, government’s behavior becomes consistent with the 
human rights norms, where its officials no longer pursue human rights violations. If violations 
still happen, the perpetrators are more likely to be subject to state prosecution.  The following 
table provide summary for the discussion.  
Table 2.2 
Summary of Theoretical Debates on Culture of Compliance toward Human Rights Treaties’ 
Ratification  
Impact on Culture of Compliance  
Pessimism  Optimism 
Realism 
(No effect) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relevance of Naming and Shaming   
[Optimism] 
Transnational Legal Process 
(Positive effects) 
[Cautious Optimism] 
Regime Theory 
(Possible positive 
effects in the long 
term dependent on 
political will of high 
standard countries) 
[Conditional Optimism] 
Liberalism 
(Positive effect dependent on 
the extent of democracy)  
 
Transnational HRs Advocacy 
Networks 
(Positive effect dependent on 
domestic human rights 
advocacy with international 
linkages) 
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One of the most effective methods for encouraging state compliance with human rights 
obligations, in relation to legal commitments accepted by ratifying international treaties, is the 
practice of focusing moral outrage upon violators, widely known as “naming and shaming”.  
Cronin-Furman (2009) argued, 
“The power and efficacy of ‘naming and shaming’ suggest that its persistent use must 
stem from more than just the inadequacy of legal enforcement: it is derived from 
U[niversal] D[eclaration of] H[uman] R[ights]’s encapsulation of the idea that human 
rights are accompanied by moral obligations” (177).  
 
Conrad and DeMeritt (2011) shared the same thought. They argue that naming and shaming are 
international attempts to influence the domestic policy choice of ill-behaved governments. These 
attempts involve advocacy campaigns organized by other governments, international 
organizations, advocacy groups and the global news media, to shine negative publicity on the 
abuses (2-3).  
Naming and shaming is “a popular strategy to enforce international human rights norms 
and laws” (Hafner-Burton 2008, 689) and indeed “an important part of moral advocacy” 
(Schmitz, 4). Bhagwati (2002) argued, 
“…[T]he use of non-trade-sanctions approaches is for several reasons likely to be more 
effective than the use of trade sanctions in advancing social and moral agendas. So the 
common argument that ILO has no teeth, that is, no trade sanctions, is wrong. I would 
argue that God gave us not just teeth but also a tongue; and a good tongue-lashing, based 
on evaluations that are credible, impartial, and unbiased, can push a country into better 
policies through shame, guilt, and the activities of NGOs that act on such findings” (79). 
 
Lebovic and Voeten asserted “shaming is possible because states share a sense of membership in 
international community” (quoted in Edwards et.al 2008, 393). 
Transnational legal process theorists argue that states would rather engage in social-
psychological conformity by joining international human rights regimes rather than bear the cost 
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of non-conformity, such as dissonance and shunning. Theorists of transnational human rights 
advocacy networks argue that shaming violators puts governments in the global spotlight for 
abuses. They see this as an effective way to challenge violators by using their tactical 
concessions to conform to human rights treaty norms to expose them. Indeed, NGOs, media and 
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights have used the strategy since 1975, such as 
shown by the following figure.  
Figure 2.1 – Number of Countries Shamed Over Time 
         
Reproduce from Hafner-Burton 2008, 690.  
(Note: NGOs: naming and shaming by Amnesty International’s press releases and background 
reports; Media: naming and shaming by Newsweek and The Economist’s article on human 
rights; UN: naming and shaming by United Nations Commission on Human Rights’ resolution 
condemning human rights violations).    
 
Evidence from scholarly research on the effectiveness of naming and shaming for 
addressing human rights violations is mixed. Hafner-Burton (2008) analyzed the relationship 
between global naming and shaming and outcomes of government repression in 145 countries 
from 1975 to 2000. She generated data from Amnesty International press releases or a country’s 
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background report, articles with human rights’ content published in Newsweek and The 
Economist, and naming and shaming by UNCHR.10 She argued that whether or not naming and 
shaming would be followed by better government protections for human rights could be 
explained in three ways (691-94).  
The first is that naming and shaming does not have any impacts toward the governments’ 
human rights practices. She includes Israel – among the most common target of global spotlight, 
China, Colombia, Cuba, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Palestine and Russia where naming and 
shaming have no apparent effect; severe human rights violations continue despite years of global 
spotlights.   
The second is that naming and shaming can have unintended consequences, which 
applies to two different circumstances. One the one hand, the global spotlight may encourage 
domestic political movement(s) to constrain the abusive government. The offending government 
might respond by increasing the use of repression to keep them in power. Consequently, more 
political activists would be subjected to more severe abuses in the process of gaining respect in 
the long run. Thus, we observe that more human rights abuses follow the spotlight. On the other 
hand, the global spotlight may create a moral hazard, by providing incentives to the rebel groups, 
warlords, and militias to escalate their acts of violence while inadequately protecting civilians 
they used as human shields from retaliation by government’s forces. This is especially common 
in many countries in Africa where agents of terror are gained enough military might to challenge 
                                                 
10 On March 15, 2006, United Nations Human Rights Council replaced the United 
Nations Human Rights Council (UNCHR). It is a subsidiary body of the United Nations General 
Assembly and serves as a UN principal mechanism and an international forum concerned with 
the promotion and the protection of human rights. Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), on the other hand, coordinates human rights 
activities throughout the United Nations system and supervises the United Nations Human 
Rights Council. 
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authority over resources, such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Northern Uganda, 
Darfur-Sudan, etc. 
The third possibility is persuasion, when naming and shaming resulted in the adoption of 
better practices and legislation afterward, which is dependent on the countries’ degree of 
democracy. In sum, she concluded that governments shone globally for abuses often extensively 
continue their use of political terror while reducing some violations of political rights toward 
their subjects. 
Busmann and Schneider (2009) examined whether or not the presence of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a distinctively impartial, neutral and independent 
organization, and the international guardian of the Law of Wars, had a restrained effect on the 
conflict parties. They contended that the presence of ICRC in conflict zones is associated with 
more rather than fewer killings, committed both by government and rebel troops against the 
civilian population. Their finding suggested, “naming and shaming possessed by the ICRC as an 
instrument of deterrence is not sufficiently strong” (16).  
Wright and Escribà-Folch (2009) studied how human rights’ naming and shaming 
affected the risk of irregular and regular exits from power of authoritarian leaders. Their study 
contended different results for different type of regimes. In autocracies, naming and shaming 
signaled international disapproval to elites in the targeted country, an influence that could 
destabilize leaders since it creates an increasingly conducive opportunity to replace the 
incumbent. In personalist regimes, not only naming and shaming would increase the risk of 
irregular exit from power, due to the lack of peaceful means of replacing incumbent, but also 
would decrease the transfer of foreign aid and the conduct of international trade. Consequently, it 
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lowers incumbent ability to pay off domestic coalitions to enhance political survival.11 In non-
personalist regimes, naming and shaming would “increase the risk of regular turnover of power, 
but has little effect on the risk of irregular exit or international flows of aid and trade” (3).  
Wong (2010, 1) contended that NGOs success in naming and shaming is “affected by the 
qualities of the domestic legal ambiguity surrounding the human rights violations and the 
imminence of death.” She generated data from Amnesty International Urgent Action letter-
writing campaigns from 1974 to 2004, and argued that naming and shaming would be successful 
on cases of torture, arbitrary arrest and prisoner of conscience (POCs) due to the combination of 
high legal ambiguity and low imminence of death. In other combinations, human rights naming 
and shaming would likely fail.  These include cases of extra judicial executions, disappearances, 
and death penalty.  
DeMeritt (2010) analyzed the naming and shaming behavior of Amnesty International, 
The Economist and Newsweek, and the UNCHR to influence the intentional and extralegal killing 
of civilians. She operationalized the principal-agent relationship arguing that in order for killing 
to take place, it requires the existence of a government (the principal) that gives orders to kill, 
and perpetrators (the agent) for executing the order. She concluded that Amnesty International’s 
naming and shaming, through its press releases and country’s background reports, decreases the 
likelihood of killing. Her finding suggested that media attention had no significant impact on 
                                                 
11 Bueno de Masquita and Smith modeled how the size of leader’s coalition and 
government revenues affected trades between policy concession and aid. The bigger the coalition 
size is, the more incumbent will rely on public goods to reward supporters, making it difficult to 
compensate for policy concessions. However, small-coalition leaders rely more on private goods 
to retain office, making it easier to grant policy concessions for aid. Using data of bilateral aid 
transferred by OECD from 1960 to 2001, they contended that aid transfers occurred according to 
the political survival interests of donor and recipient government leaders. This is the harmful of 
foreign aid to the citizens of the recipient states; they get policy they would rather not have and 
the flow of foreign aid helps their autocratic incumbent leadership survive and continue to pursue 
such unpopular policies in the future.  
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government killing. Nonetheless, UNCHR’s naming and shaming decreases civilians death toll.  
Hendrix and Wong (2010, 2) incorporated a dataset of more than 12,000 Amnesty 
International Urgent Action’s campaign to find whether or not direct communication with 
violator states had a positive impact on respect for human rights. They argued that positive 
outcome could happen for two reasons. First is that “targeting violators bypasses Western 
policymakers, […], and in doing so recognizing the legitimacy of target states even as specific 
practices are condemned.” Second is that direct communication, which engaged NGO with states 
via letter writing by concerned individuals, created common knowledge of committed abuse, and 
placed violator states’ out of its comfort zone for believing its ill behavior act went undercover.  
Conrad and DeMeritt (2011, i) studied the relationship between international human 
rights advocacy and state repression substitutability; what is the likelihood that states would 
employ one means of repression over others. Their research constituted certain types of human 
rights violation, especially political imprisonment and one-sided government killing, - violations 
shamed in UNCHR’ resolutions from 1995 to 2005. Their finding suggested that state leaders do 
indeed engaged in repression substitution: “UNCHR’s naming and shaming of one type of 
physical integrity rights often leads to increases in other types of repression, especially in 
democracies.”  
Krain (forthcoming) studied the effectiveness of naming and shaming campaigns by 
Amnesty International, The Economist, Newsweek, and UNCHR in reducing the severity of 
genocides or politicides. He incorporated the PITF data of genocides and politicides from 1976 
to 2008 and contended that the international naming and shaming had “significant ameliorative 
effects” to save civilians’ life. His finding confirmed the importance role played by transnational 
advocacy networks on naming and shaming.   
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In sum, the overall assessment in the literature about the real and potential effectiveness 
of naming and shaming confirms that it is a popular strategy to enforce compliance with 
international human rights norms and laws and to challenge perpetrators of human rights 
violations. Thus, it has sufficient ameliorative effect to save civilian life. Given the inadequacy 
of a legal enforcement mechanism at the international level, voice and shame can be an effective 
way to influence domestic policy choice of states and to uphold obligations to respect, protect, 
and fulfill human rights principles.  
 
Establishment of the ICC  
The rationale for establishment of the ICC is that serious perpetrators of crimes against 
humanity, genocide, and war crimes must be punished. The great development in international 
law that was the result of the creation of International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and 
Tokyo after the World War II represented the beginning of the codification of rules of law 
designed to protect individuals from the atrocities committed by their own governments (Ratner 
et.al 2009, xlv). These two ad-hoc tribunals were also the first to hold individuals accountable for 
violations of human dignity.  
The Nuremberg tribunals specifically had three jurisprudential derivations concerning the 
protection of individuals (Ratner et.al, 7). First, it paved the way for the International Committee 
of the Red Cross as a controlling authority for international humanitarian law codification. 
Second, it provided a foundation for the development of international human rights law. The 
international community came to realize that government could commit human rights crimes in 
peacetime; therefore, these atrocities have to be regulated by international law. Third, “it laid the 
groundwork for further elaboration of international law on individual criminal responsibility for 
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violations of international humanitarian and human rights law” (Ratner et.al, 7).   
The study of individual accountability for human rights atrocities must consider four 
interrelated bodies of law12, they are: 
a. International human rights law, which refers to the body of international law aimed at 
protecting the rights of individuals against their own governments or other actors in the 
international community that might violate their rights.  
b. International humanitarian law or the law governing the conduct of armed conflict. It is 
rooted on The Law of The Hague and The Law of Geneva, trying to limit the war making 
methods and providing protections to innocent civilians during wartime.  
c. International criminal law, which refers to the international law assigning criminal 
                                                 
12 See the following literatures for more discussion on each development of the four 
bodies of law: Theodor Meron, ‘Some Reflections on the Status of Forces Agreements in the 
Light of Customary International Law,’ in The International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 
6.4, 1957; Theodor Meron, ‘Norm Making and Supervision in International Human Rights: 
Reflections on Institutional Order,’ in The American Journal of International Law Vol. 76.4, 
1982; Theodor Meron, ‘On the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and 
the Need for A New Instrument,’ in The American Journal of International Law Vol. 77.3, 1983; 
Theodor Meron, ‘Reform of the Lawmaking in the United Nations: The Human Rights Instance,’ 
in The American Journal of International Law Vol. 79.3, 1985; Theodor Meron, ‘On A Hierarchy 
of International Human Rights,’ in The American Journal of International Law Vol 80.1, 1986; 
Theodor Meron, ‘The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law,’ in The American Journal of 
International Law Vol. 81.2, 1987; David Weissbrodt, ‘Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict: 
The Role of International Nongovernmental Organizations,’ in Journal of Peace Research Vol. 
24.3, 1987; Theodor Meron, ‘War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International 
Law,’ in The American Journal of International Law Vol. 88.1, 1994; Theodor Meron, 
‘Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties,’ in The American Journal of International Law Vol. 
89.1, 1995; Theodor Meron, ‘International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities,’ in The 
American Journal of International Law Vol. 89.3, 1995; Theodor Meron, ‘The Continuing Role 
of Custom in the Formation of International Humanitarian Law,’ in The American Journal of 
International Law Vol. 90.2, 1996; Theodor Meron, ‘War Crimes Law Comes of Age,’ The 
American Journal of International Law Vol. 92.3, 1998; Theodor Meron, ‘The Marten Clause, 
Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience,’ in The American Journal of 
International Law Vol. 94.1, 2000; Theodor Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law,’ in 
The American Journal of International Law Vol. 94.2, 2000; and Theodor Meron, ‘Revival of 
Customary Humanitarian Law,’ in The American Journal of International Law Vol. 99.4, 2005.   
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responsibilities for certain serious violations of international law. Roach noted that the 
link between state sovereignty and accountability is the most essential feature of 
international criminal law’s evolution (19).  
d. The domestic law of the state, which its codifications provide legal framework for other 
methods of accountability, for example fact-finding commissions, individual civil 
liability, truth and reconciliation commission, and repatriation of IDPs. (Ratner et.al, 9-
11) 
The ICC incorporated those four bodies of law in its legal foundation, the Rome Statute, 
which entered into force on July 1, 2002, thus marking the establishment of the ICC. The 
adoption of the Rome Statute on July 17, 1998 during the United Nations Diplomatic Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in Rome, Italy, 
revived the half of century’s dormancy of international community’s effort to the pursuit of 
collective goods aimed at closing the political, practical, and judicial gaps that have long fostered 
a culture of impunity.13 
The ICC differs from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in important respects. The 
ICC is a supranational entity that can enforce international law of personal responsibility against 
                                                 
13 Roach called the establishment of the ICC in order to challenge the link between 
sovereignty and impunity (19), while Broomhall (2003) argued that it was the result of the 
developing works around international criminal law that presented a challenge between the 
sovereignty of the powerful states and the pursuit of justice, peace and human rights (vii). See 
Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, ‘The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,’ in The 
American Journal of International Law Vol. 93.1, 1999; Indira Rosenthal, ‘Making the 
International Criminal Court Work, A Handbook for Implementing the Rome Statute,’ in the 
Human Rights Watch Report Vol. 13, September 2001; Marc Weller, ‘Undoing the Global 
Constitution: UN Security Council Action on the International Criminal Court,’ in International 
Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs) Vol. 78.4, 2002; Dapo Akande, ‘International 
Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court,’ in The American Journal of International 
Law Vol. 98.3, 2004; and William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal 
Court, Third Edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) for more insightful and 
deeper analysis toward the establishment of the ICC.   
 30 
individuals, but only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of the Statute 
and has no retroactive effect. While International Court of Justice is the judicial organ of the 
United Nations whose functions are to decide legal disputes submitted to it by states and to 
provide advisory opinions on legal questions. 
Unlike previous war crimes courts with jurisdiction limited to specific conflicts, the ICC 
is a permanent institution whose jurisdiction extends to the following circumstances: 
a. Where the person accused of committing crimes is a national of a State Party  
b. Where the alleged crimes was committed on the territory of a State Party 
c. Where a situation is referred to it by the UN Security Council (where the Court can not 
otherwise exercise its jurisdiction) 
The latter provides the Court a circumstance in which individuals from countries that are 
not parties to the Rome Statute may be subject to its jurisdiction. However, the ICC is 
complementary to national criminal procedures, meaning that the prosecutions for international 
crimes are expected to take place in domestic courts.14  
The Rome Statute strengthens and consolidates the doctrine of universality in three ways 
(Weller 2002, 694). First, it refined the list of international crimes that attract genuinely universal 
jurisdiction. The Statute covers both war crimes, which can be committed only during armed 
conflict, and gross human rights violations that can be committed in peacetime and in war. The 
Statute’s list of war crimes is extensive; it includes acts prohibited by the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions on the laws of war, and crimes in internal armed conflict. The Statute also contains 
                                                 
14 Rome Statute 1998 Article 1 concludes, “An International Criminal Court (“the Court”) 
is hereby established. It shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its 
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in 
this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and 
functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.”  
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special rules that extend the Court’s war crimes jurisdiction to civil wars, which historically not 
regulated by international law. For the first time in a legally binding international treaty, the 
Statute contains a definition of gender, and includes gender-based crimes both as crimes against 
humanity and war crimes (Spees 2003, 1243)15. Second, the Statute affirms the classic 
international law jurisdictional framework, that States have duty to exercise their jurisdiction 
over such crimes. Third, it establishes a new means of trying to punish, and thereby deter future 
cases of gross human rights violation through the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court to organize the exercise of jurisdiction by way of supranational entity.16  
Under the Rome Statute, there are two forms of criminal responsibility. Individual 
criminal responsibility (Article 25) is when the person commits a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court individually or jointly with or through another person; by ordering, soliciting or 
                                                 
15 Both the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo ignored rape and 
violence against women in their judgments. By contrast, both the ICTY and ICTR statutes 
include rape as a crime against humanity, and they succeeded in prosecuting various forms of 
sexual violence as instruments of genocide, crimes against humanity, and crimes of war have 
developed the international humanitarian law (Meron(g), 567). The inclusion of gender-based 
crimes in the ICC’s jurisdiction had to be attributed to the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice’s 
advocacy to correct deficiencies of sexual crimes and gender violence in existing humanitarian 
law, as well as to mainstream gender in the ICC. This coalition was formed in 1997 as part of the 
Coalition for an International Criminal Court and intended to infuse the discussion during the 
Rome Conference with a gender perspective and advance the recognition of women’s right as 
human rights. Their works were also extraordinary in regard to the adoption of gender definition 
in the Rome Statute, the first in a legally binding international treaty (Article 7(3)). See Pam 
Spees, ‘Woman’s Advocacy in the Creation of the International Criminal Court: Changing the 
Landscapes of Justice and Power,’ in Signs Vol. 28.4, 2003 for more insightful explanation.  
16 The Rome Statute bestowed important supranational aspects on the ICC consisting of 
three elements that could be present alone or all together in three circumstances, as described by 
Amitai Etzioni in Political Unification Revisited: On Building Supranational Communities 
(2001). Other international organizations that also have supranational aspects are European Court 
of Human Rights, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, International Court of Justice, 
International Seabed Authority, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, North American 
Free Trade Agreement, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, United Nation 
Security Council, United Nations General Assembly, and World Trade Organization. See 
Appendix E for further referrals to the ICC’s supranational elements and its comparison to those 
of the International Court of Justice.  
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inducing the commission of a crime; and by aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting to the 
commission or attempted commission of a crime. Commanders or other superiors’ responsibility 
(Article 28) is when a military commander, person effectively acting as a military commander, or 
a superior fails to exercise control over the circumstances where he or she should have known 
that the forces or subordinates under his or her effective command were committing or about to 
commit crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; he or she should prevent or repress the 
commission of such crimes or submit the matter for investigation and prosecution; and the 
crimes concerned the activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of the 
superior.  
Pursuant to the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor can initiate an investigation on the basis of 
referral from any State Party or from the United Nations Security Council.17 The Prosecutor can 
also initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of information received from individuals or 
organizations. Despite the fact that the International Law Commission did not allow a prosecutor 
to initiate investigations on his own, but the Preparatory Committee suggested otherwise; “an 
independent prosecutor was needed as a condition for maintaining and promoting the 
independence of the ICC vis-à-vis the Security Council” (Roach 2006, 33).  
Prior to the Rome Conference, in March 1998, Germany and Argentina introduced a 
proposal to accommodate the dividing State delegations on this issue; the Prosecutor proprio 
                                                 
17 Rome Statute, Article 13 concludes, “The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with 
respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provision of this Statute if: 
(a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred 
to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 14; 
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred 
to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations; or 
(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance with 
article 15.  
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motu powers have to be accompanied by a mechanism to check his discretion at an early stage of 
the investigation. Therefore, the decision would be subject to judicial review by a Pre-Trial 
Chamber. The Prosecutor could commence the investigation only after being granted 
authorization by a Pre-Trial Chamber. (Bergsmo and Pejic´ quoted in Danner 2003, 515; and 
Danner 2003, 514-15).  
To date, the Prosecutor has opened investigations into seven situations: the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Uganda, the Central African Republic (all of which referred situations 
occurring on their territories to the Court), Darfur-Sudan (the case was referred by the UN 
Security Council through Resolution No. 1593 adopted on March 31, 2005), Libya Arab 
Jamahiriya (it was referred by the UN Security Council through Resolution No. 1970 adopted on 
February 26, 2011), Republic of Kenya (on March 31, 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber II granted the 
Prosecutor authorization to open an investigation proprio motu), and Côte d’Ivoire (Pre-Trial 
Chamber III granted the authorization to open an investigation proprio motu on October 3, 
2011).  
The jurisdiction granted to the ICC allows it to send a very strong message that grave 
breaches of international crimes would be prosecuted. The work of the ICC is most effective in 
giving voice to non-state actors, regularizing ways of bringing international voices into the 
process, providing information to other stakeholders, and naming and shaming as a way to focus 
international attention. The table below summarizes investigations by the ICC as of October 
2011. 
 
 
Table 2.3 
Summary of Investigations and Prosecutions by the International Criminal Court As of October 31, 2011 
Situation and 
Referral 
Individuals 
Indicted1 
Indicted2 Transfer to the 
ICC/Initial 
Appearance3 
Confirmation 
of Charges 
Hearing/ 
Result 
Trial Result Status Date Genocide 
Crimes 
Against 
Humanity 
War 
Crimes 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo (ICC-
01/04) by the 
government of 
the DRC 
Referral:  
04/19/2004 
Investigation 
opened:  
06/23/2004 
Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo 02/10/2006 - - 3 
03/17/2006 
 
03/20/2006 
9-28 
November 
2006 
 
Confirmed 
01/29/2007 
01/26/2009 
– 
08/26/2011 
In ICC custody, 
Trial Chamber I 
closed on 26 
August 2011, 
judgment 
pending 
Bosco 
Ntaganda 08/22/2006 - - 3    Fugitive 
Germain 
Katanga 07/02/2007 - 3 6 
10/17/2007 
22/10/2007 
27 June-18 
July 2008 
 
Confirmed 
09/26/2008 
Began 
11/24/2009 
In ICC custody, 
trial before 
Trial Chamber 
II ongoing 
Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui 07/06/2007 - 3 6 
02/06/2008 
02/11/2008 
 
Callixte 
Mbarushimana 
 
09/28/2010 
 
- 
 
5 
 
6 
 
01/25/2011 
 
01/28/2011 
16-21 
September 
2011 
Result pending 
 
In ICC custody, 
pre-trial phase 
before Pre-Trial 
Chamber I 
ongoing 
Northern 
Uganda  
(ICC-02/04)  
by the Ugandan 
government 
Referral: 
01/29/2004 
Investigation 
opened:  
07/29/2004 
Joseph Kony 
 
 
 
 
8 July 2005 
- 12 21    Fugitive 
Vincent Otti - 11 21 
   Fugitive, 
reportedly died 
in 2007 
Raska Lukwiya - 1 3 
   Proceedings 
finished; died 
on 08/12/2006 
Okot Odhiambo - 3 7    Fugitive 
Dominic 
Ongwen - 3 4    Fugitive 
Central African 
Republic 
Jean –Pierre 
Bemba Gombo 
05/23/2008 
 - 3 5 
07/03/2008 
 
12-15 January 
2009 
Began 
11/22/2010 
In ICC custody, 
trial before 
34 
 
(ICC.02/04) 
by the 
government of 
the CAR 
Referral:  
01/07/2005 
Investigation 
opened:  
05/22/2007 
06/10/2008 07/04/2008  
Confirmed 
06/15/2009 
Trial Chamber 
III ongoing 
Darfur, Sudan 
(ICC-02/05) 
by the UN 
Security 
Council 
Referral:  
03/31/2005 
Investigation 
opened:  
06/06/2005 
Ahmed Haroun 
04/27/2007 
- 20 22    Fugitive 
Ali Kushayb  - 22 28    Fugitive 
Omar al-Bashir 03/04/2009 07/12/2010 3 5 2    Fugitive 
Bahr Idriss Abu 
Garda 
05/07/2009 
(summons 
to appear) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
3 
 
05/18/2009 
19-29 October 
2009 
Dismissed 
02/08/2010 
 Proceedings 
finished with 
charges 
dismissed 
Abdallah Banda 
Abakaer 
Nourain  08/27/2009 
(summons 
to appear) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
3 
 
 
 
06/17/2010 
 
12/08/2010 
 
Confirmed 
03/07/2011 
To begin in 
2012 
Appearing 
voluntarily, 
charges 
confirmed, trial 
before Trial 
Chamber IV to 
begin in 2012 
Saleh 
Mohammed 
Jerbo Jamus 
 
- 
 
- 
 
3 
Republic of 
Kenya 
(ICC-01/09) 
Authorization 
by a Pre-Trial 
Chamber 
Authorization:  
03/31/2010 
Investigation 
opened:  
03/31/2010 
William Samoei 
Ruto 
 
03/08/2011 
(summons 
to appear) 
- 4 - 
04/07/2011 
1-8 September 
2011 
Result pending 
 Appearing 
voluntarily, pre-
trial phase 
before Pre-Trial 
Chamber II 
ongoing 
Henry Kiprono 
Kosgey - 4 - 
 
Joshua Arap 
Sang - 4 - 
 
Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura 
 
03/08/2011 
(summons 
to appear) 
- 5 - 
04/08/2011 
21 September-
5 October 
2011 
Result pending 
 Appearing 
voluntarily, pre-
trial phase 
before Pre-Trial 
Chamber II 
ongoing 
Uhuru Muigai 
Kenyatta - 5 - 
 
Mohammed 
Hussein Ali - 5 - 
 
Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya 
Muammar 
Gaddafi 06/27/2011 - 2 - 
   Proceedings 
finished; died 
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(ICC-01/11) 
by the UN 
Security 
Council 
Referral:  
02/26/2011 
Investigation 
opened:  
03/03/2011 
on 10/20/2011 
Saif al-Islam 
Gaddafi - 2 - 
   Fugitive 
Abdullah 
Senussi - 2 - 
   
Fugitive 
Republic of 
Côte d’Ivoire  
 
   
   Investigation 
authorized by 
Pre-Trial 
Chamber III 
on10/03/2011  
Reproduce from “Detailed Summary of Investigations and Prosecutions by the International Criminal Court” with some changes, 
obtained from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal _Court                                                          
1 Only persons who are publicly indicted are listed here. Nonetheless, the ICC can issue an indictment under seal.  
2 If not otherwise noted, the indicted is wanted by warrant of arrest issued by Pre-Trial Chambers.  
3 If there was a warrant of arrest, the dates of transfer to the ICC (in italics) and have the initial appearance is given in the form of 
MM/DD/YYYY. Otherwise, only the date of initial appearance is given.  
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United States Opposition to the ICC18 
The United States was one of only seven nations, joining China, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, 
Qatar and Israel, to vote against the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The 
US is perhaps one of the Court’s more hostile opponents and constantly seeks the immunity of its 
citizens from prosecution. Examples include: 
a. Un-signing; in an unprecedented diplomatic maneuver on May 6, 2002, George W. Bush 
administration denounced the US signatory of the Rome Statute. Therefore, the US did 
not intend to be bound by Clinton administration’ signature to the Statute on December 
31, 2000, or to ratify it.  
b. Bilateral Immunity Agreement; in continuing its policy to undermine the ICC, the US 
requested its friends and allies to approve bilateral agreements requiring them not to 
surrender American nationals to the ICC. (See Appendix D for more details on Bilateral 
Immunity Agreement).  
c. UN Security Council Resolutions 1422 and 1487; following the entry into force of the 
Rome Statute, the US negotiated a Security Council resolution to provide exemption for 
U.S. personnel operating in UN peacekeeping operations. Resolution 1422 came into 
effect July 1, 2002 for a period of one year. Later, it was renewed for a year by 
                                                 
18 See Bruce Broomhall, ‘Toward U.S. Acceptance of the International Criminal Court,’ 
in Law and Contemporary Problems Vol. 64.1, 2001; Michael P. Scharf, ‘The ICC’s Jurisdiction 
over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position’ in Law and 
Contemporary Problems Vol. 64.1, 2001; Monroe Leigh, ‘The United States and the Statute of 
Rome,’ in The American Journal of International Law Vol. 95.1, 2001; ‘U.S. Signing of the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court,’ in The American Journal of International Law Vol. 
95.2, 2001; ‘U.S. View of Crime of Aggression,’ in The American Journal of International Law 
Vol. 95.2, 2001; ‘U.S. Notification of Intent Not to Become a Party to the Rome Statute,’ in The 
American Journal of International Law Vol. 96.3, 2002; and John P. Cerone, ‘Dynamic 
Equilibrium: The Evolution of US Attitudes toward International Criminal Courts and Tribunals,’ 
in The European Journal of International Law Vol. 18.2, 2007.  
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Resolution 1487 which passed on June 12, 2003. The US failed to secure another renewal 
following the abuse of Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib by American troops.  
a. American Service-Members’ Protection Act (ASPA); the U.S Congress passed this law.  
It was later signed by President Bush on August 2, 2002 to assist the administration's 
effort to obtain bilateral impunity agreements. The major anti-ICC provisions in ASPA 
are: (i) a prohibition on U.S. cooperation with the ICC; (ii) the Hague Invasion Act 
provision: authorizing the President to use all means necessary and appropriate to free 
any U.S. personnel or allied personnel detained or imprisoned by the ICC; and (iii) 
punishment for States joining the ICC treaty through the refusal of military aid to State 
Parties to the treaty (except major U.S. allies).  
As a matter of fact, the parties to the Rome Statute thought it was important to have the 
US on board before the Statute came into effect. The US was portrayed as an important influence 
that would add to the legitimacy of the regime, since the US had been a strong supporter of 
international criminal justice, including, most remarkably, the International Military Tribunals at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, the ICTY, and the ICTR. However, during the Rome Conference, other 
state delegations realized that the US was persistent in exempting any US nationals from the 
application of the Court’s jurisdiction.  This went against an effort to prohibit special immunities 
of any kind. Other countries like Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom refrained 
from expressing concerns about the Court interfering with the peace-keeping functions of their 
armed services.19 The international community was obviously ready to move forward without the 
US on board. 
                                                 
19 Some of US fixed negotiations included but not limited to the objection of proprio 
motu power of the Prosecutor and universal jurisdiction of the ICC, was heavily rejected by the 
Group of Like-Minded States, consisted of over 60 states, including NATO and US’ European 
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allies. In addition, Non-Aligned Movement arguing “any determination of the definition and 
occurrence of aggression by the Security Council would politicize the Court, since it would allot 
the P5 to exercise the veto power to block the investigation and prosecution of such crimes” 
rejected US proposal regarding the definition of crimes of aggression. Both groups also rejected 
US proposal that the Court ought to require Security Council’s approval prior to the beginning of 
investigation of cases (Roach, chapter 6; Broomhall, chapter 9).  
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PART III 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DARFUR, SUDAN AND THE DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 
 
A. Darfur, Sudan  
The Republic of Sudan, a country in northeastern Africa, is the third largest country in 
Africa, after Algeria and Congo-Kinshasa with a population around 30.9 million. Sudan is 
divided along lines of religion (Sunni Islam, animist, and Christian), ethnicity (Africa and Arab 
origin), tribe, and economic activity (nomadic and sedentary). Sudan is both a refugee generating 
and a refugee hosting country. The majority of the refugees come from Eritrea, Chad, Ethiopia, 
and the Central African Republic.  
Sudan’s various ethnicities split into two major groups: Sudanese Arab of the largely 
Muslim sector that inhabits Northern Sudan and the largely Christian and animist Nilotic who 
inhabit Southern Sudan. As the result of its political turmoil since independence, Sudan is also 
divided along two ideological lines: a united, secular, and democratic country, which attracted 
many northern Sudanese, and the southern Sudanese’s demand for self-determination. Following 
a referendum in January 2011, South Sudan seceded on July 9, 2011 and claimed the area of 
Bahr al Ghazal, Equatoria, and Greater Upper Nile. On July 14, 2011, South Sudan became a 
member of the United Nations. 
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Sudan’s Political Instability20 
Until 1946, the British and the Egyptian government administered south Sudan and north 
Sudan as separate regions. The British had further emphasized the divisions by restricting the 
movement of people from north to south and vice versa. The law was enacted to prevent the 
spread of malaria to the British troops, to facilitate access of Christian missionaries to the animist 
population and to stopping the Arab and Islamic influence from advancing to the south.  
Just before its independence, the British decided to merge the two into one single 
administrative region while the political power was granted to northern elites. The tensions over 
the nature of two regions were heightened when it was obvious that the northern leaders refused 
to give the southerners’ substantial autonomy. Just a year before independence was granted, both 
regions started fighting.  Seventeen years of fighting in the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972) 
resulted in half a million people dying.   
In August 1955, the southern army officers mutinied in Torit, Juba, Yei, and Maridi. A 
trial of a southern member of the national assembly and an allegedly false telegram urging 
northern administrators in the south to oppress the southerners triggered the mutiny. After the 
mutinies were suppressed, the survivors began an uncoordinated insurgency in rural areas and 
transformed into a secessionist movement called Anya-Nya. The new secessionist movement 
now demanded the right to govern southern Sudan. Between 1963 and 1969 they expanded to the 
other two southern provinces: Upper Nile and Bahr al Ghazal.   
At the same time, the separatist movement was suffering from internal ethnic 
factionalisms: a situation that the government was unable to take advantage of due to its own 
                                                 
20 The content of this section is summarized from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sudan, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudan, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/sudan.aspx, and 
various ICG Policy Briefings and Reports mentioned in the bibliography.  
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political instability. Prime Minister Ismail Al-Azhari led the first independent government of 
Sudan, but a military coup in 1958 led by Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Ibrahim Abboud 
overthrew him. The resentment over military government led to a popular uprising that resulted 
in the creation of an interim government in October 1964. Colonel Gaafar Nimeiry led the 
second military coup, which took place on May 25, 1969. Tensions between Marxist and non-
Marxist factions in the ruling military class led to another coup in July 1971 and brought the 
Sudanese Communist Party into power. Nimeiry was able to seize power back, but was 
overthrown by another popular uprising in 1985. In 1986, Sadiq Al-Mahdi from the Umma Party 
was elected Prime Minister.  
In July 1971, former army lieutenant Joseph Lagu unified the separatist movement of the 
southern Sudan under one command called Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM).  
During the negotiation mediated by World Council of Churches and All Africa Conference of 
Churches, SSLM was the representative and negotiated on behalf of the entire south. The Addis 
Ababa Agreement of March 1972 ended the conflict and a single administrative region of the 
Southern Sudan Autonomous Region was granted to the southerners. However, this agreement 
failed to completely dispel the tensions that had caused the civil war, leading to a reigniting of 
conflict resulting in Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005)21.  
Nimeiry increased the tension between the South and the North by circumventing the 
Addis Ababa Agreement of March 1972, which culminated in the imposition of Islamic laws on 
all of Sudan, thus disrupting autonomy in the Southern Sudan region. In 1983, Colonel John 
Garang who founded and led the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) started launching 
attacks against the government on the behalf of the southerners. The SPLA was in control of 
                                                 
21 See ICG Africa Report No. 48, Dialogue or Destruction? Organising for Peace as the 
War in Sudan Escalates, 27 June 2002, for more thoughtful analysis of the second civil war.  
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large areas of Equatoria, Bahr al Ghazal, and Upper Nile provinces and operated in the southern 
portions of Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile provinces.  
The conflict was rooted in the acquisition of natural resources in the south: oil and fertile 
land suitable for agriculture. This exploitation had been conducted by the government of 
northern Sudan since independence, which gave its elite much more political advantages. The 
southerners fought back, demanding an equal share of natural resources and a degree of political 
autonomy for their region. During the course of the campaign against the rebel movement, the 
government created a counterinsurgency strategy that exploited ethnic divisions by sponsoring 
ethnically based militias to attack rebel groups and terrorize and forcibly displace civilians.  
In Khartoum, Colonel Omar Al Bashir seized power from the unstable coalition 
government of Prime Minister Sadiq Al-Mahdi in a bloodless military coup in June 1989. He 
followed with the suspension of political parties and the introduction of an Islamic legal code on 
the national level. On October 16, 1993, Al Bashir appointed himself the president of the 
country. He transformed Sudan into a single-party state and created the National Congress Party 
(NCP) and filled all of the important position within the government with members of his party.  
In August 1991, the SPLA faced its first internal dissension. Riak Machar and Lam Akol 
led the attempt to overthrow Colonel John Garang, forming the Nuer faction named Sudan 
People’s Democratic Front (SPDF). Indeed, the Nuer is the second largest ethnic group in south 
Sudan. In September 1992, William Nyuon Bany formed a second rebel faction, and in February 
1953, Kerubino Kwanyin Bol formed a third rebel faction. In 1997, the government signed the 
Nuba Mountains cease-fire with the rebel factions, calling for a degree of autonomy and the right 
of self-determination for the south. In January 2002, John Garang and Riak Maahar signed an 
agreement to merge the SPDF and SPLA. To increase its bargaining power prior to the next 
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round of peace agreements, the SPLA also formed a strategic partnership with the Sudan 
Alliances Forces (SAF), the largest armed opposition force in the north.  
Nonetheless, Khartoum and SPLM made substantial progress toward a conflict 
resolution. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)22 was signed on January 9, 2005 in 
Nairobi, designed to end the North-South civil war in Darfur.  Both parties agreed to the 
following: 
a. The south would be granted substantial autonomy for six years, followed by a referendum 
for the right of self-determination, which was held on January 9, 2011. 
b. If the referendum did not result in southern secession, then the SPLA would integrate into 
the national armed forces, forming Joint Integrated Units. 
c. The revenue from oil would be divided between the two parties during the six-year 
interim period. 
d. The SPLM would assume some roles in the Government of National Unity (GNU), as 
                                                 
22 This is a collection of agreement, including Machakos Protocol of July 2002 (see ICG 
Africa Report No. 51, Sudan’s Best Chance for Peace: How Not to Lose It, 17 September 2002, 
and ICG Africa Report No. 65, Sudan Endgame, 7 July 2003, for cross-reference), the Security 
Arrangements Agreement of September 2003 (see ICG Africa Report No. 73, Sudan: Towards an 
Incomplete Peace, 11 December 2003 for more detail), the Wealth Sharing Agreement of January 
2004, the Power Sharing Agreement (see ICG Africa Report No. 55, Power and Wealth Sharing: 
Make or Break Time in Sudan’s Peace Process, 18 December 2002 for more details), the 
Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Niles States of May 
2004, the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area of May 2004, and Permanent 
Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities of December 2004. The two 
and half years of negotiations were chaired by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) comprising Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia. See Crisis 
Group Africa Report No. 96, The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace, 25 
July 2005; Crisis Group Africa Report No. 106, Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The 
Long Road Ahead, 31 March 2006; Crisis Group Africa Report No. 130, A Strategy for 
Comprehensive Peace in Sudan, 26 July 2007; and Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 50, Sudan’s 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis, 13 March 2008, for more details on CPA. 
The digital collection of Comprehensive Peace Agreement could be obtained from 
http://www.usip.org/publications/peace-agreements-sudan 
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well as in Abyei, Blue Nile State, and Nuba Mountains’ administration.  
e. The continued use of sharia law in the south would be a matter of stipulation by the 
elected assembly. 
Amid the new hope that emerged from the signing of CPA, the United Nations Security 
Council passed three resolutions to deal with “a regime as tough-minded and inscrutable as 
Sudan, [whereas] patient diplomacy and trust in Khartoum’s [good will] has been a [constant] 
failure” (Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 43, 1): 
a. Resolution 1590 of March 24, 2005 regarding the establishment of United Mission in 
Sudan (UNMIS) for an initial six month period to support the implementation of CPA. 
The Security Council authorized the deployment of 10,000 military personnel, 
accompanied by an appropriate civilian component and up to 715 civilian police 
personnel for the enforcement of the Charter’s basic principles under Chapter VII.   
b. Resolution 1591 of March 27, 2005 regarding the extension of the earlier arms embargo 
that was imposed on non-governmental forces in Darfur and that required Khartoum to 
cease aerial bombardments over Darfur region. The Council also set up a Panel of 
Experts to monitor the arms embargo.  
c. Resolution 1593 of March 31, 2005 regarding the referral of human rights atrocities in 
Darfur to the ICC’s jurisdiction.  
A new chapter in Sudan’s civil war opened in Darfur, on February 2003. The war was 
rooted in three intersecting conflicts. First, it was conflict over political and economic 
marginalization by Khartoum. Second, it was dissatisfaction over CPA that left out the Darfuri’ 
rebels. Third, it was the local lineage of decades of disputes between “African” sedentary 
farmers and “Arab” nomadic livestock herders. The conflict culminated in the attack of Al-Fashir 
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air base, launched jointly by Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) rebels on April 25, 2003.  
The rebels were recruited primarily from the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit ethnic groups. 
The attack resulted in four Antonov bombers and helicopter gunships being destroyed on the 
ground and 75 soldiers, pilots, and technicians killed. Additionally, 32 soldiers, including the air 
base’s commander were captured. The success of the raid was shocking; having been engaged in 
the civil war in the South for 20 years, none of SPLA’s attacks on any government outposts were 
able to present such humiliating defeat. 
Soon after the raid, the Janjaweed militias, recruited mostly from Arab Abbala tribes, 
joined the side of the official Sudanese military and police.23 The better-armed Janjaweed 
quickly gained the upper hand. By the first half of 2004, several thousand people had been killed 
and as many as a million more had been forcedly displaced, leaving the non-Arab villages 
completely depopulated and causing a major humanitarian crisis in the region, such as shown in 
the following figure.  
                                                 
23 Janjaweed is indeed Khartoum’s counterinsurgency strategy to attack the rebel groups, 
terrorize and forcibly displace civilians. See the following resources: ICG Africa Briefing, 
Sudan’s Other Wars, 25 June 2003; ICG Africa Report No. 76, Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New 
Crisis, 25 March 2004; ICG Africa Report No. 80, Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur, 23 May 
2004; and ICG Africa Report No. 83, “Darfur Deadline: A New International Action Plan”, 23 
August 2004. See also Mahmood Mamdani, How Can We Name the Darfur Crisis, October 7, 
2004, obtained from http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/206-
sudan/39611.html, for Khartoum’s divide and rule policies in Darfur, including the politicization 
and militarization of ethnic groups, which explained Khartoum’s favoritism of Arab origin over 
African descendants. 
 
  
Figure 3.1 
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The Government of Sudan (GoS) and a SLA faction led by Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) 
signed the Darfur Peace Agreement on May 5, 2006. However, two other parties to the 
negotiations, the SLA faction of Abdel Wahid Mohammed Nur (SLA/AW) and the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) refused to sign. On August 31, 2006, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1706 to expand the mandate of UNMIS to include deployments in Darfur to enforce 
the DPA, which Khartoum rejected.  
Due to a peacekeeping operation that was authorized but failed to deploy, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1769 on July 31, 2007. This authorized the deployment of an 
African Union-United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).24 Nonetheless, conflict 
and insecurity persisted in Darfur. Arms and armed groups both continue to proliferate, 
subjecting more civilians to the already widespread and systematic human rights violations 
committed by both parties.25 International mediators stated that the difficulty in bringing parties 
to the peace talks was due to there being “no John Garang in Darfur”, referring to the leading 
figure among Southern rebels who represented and negotiated on behalf of the entire South. 
Khartoum started carrying out aerial bombardments in 2007 and 2008 on civilian areas it 
claimed to be under rebel control in all three Darfur states. Following the bombing, the 
                                                 
24 The following reports provide insightful explanations regarding the failure of 
peacekeeping mission to invoke ‘Responsibility to Protect’ the Darfuris: Crisis Group Africa 
Briefing No. 28, The AU’s Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps, 6 July 2005; Crisis Group 
Africa Report No. 99, The EU/AU Partnership in Darfur: Not Yet A Winning Combination, 25 
October 2005; Crisis Group Africa Report No. 105, To Save Darfur, 17 March 2006; Crisis 
Group Africa Briefing No. 39, Darfur’s Fragile Peace Agreement, 20 June 2006; Crisis Group 
Africa Briefing No. 43, Getting the UN into Darfur, 12 October 2006; and Crisis Group Africa 
Report No. 125, Darfur: Revitalising the Peace Process, 30 April 2007. 
25 See Crisis Group Africa Report No. 89, Darfur: Failure to Protect, 8 March 2005 and 
Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 32, Unifying Darfur’s Rebel: A Prerequisite for Peace, 6 
October 2005 for more discussion on Darfur’s rebel dissent. See Appendix F for Darfur’s Non-
Signatory Movements and Appendix G for Major Humanitarian Agreements Binding on 
Sudanese Parties.  
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Janjaweed carried out large-scale attacks.  These resulted in displacing people, the looting of 
livestock and properties, unlawful killings, rapes, and the burning of villages. The Janjaweed also 
attacked civilians in IDPs’ camps. Khalil, an IDP in Hasa Hisa camp in West Darfur testified to 
Amnesty International, “we asked the international community to look our way; to see how we 
were left with the Janjaweed and the government to attack us as they pleased. We were left on 
our own” (AFR 54/001/2009, n.p.).26  
The violations were conducted to justify the logic that “a dispirited and enfeebled 
population will be unable to assist the insurgency” (ICG Africa Report No. 54, 2-3). As of April 
2008, there were around 2.5 million IDPs in Darfur –this is more than one third of the population 
of Darfuris- and more than 200,000 people sought refuge in Chad. The war also displaced 
subsistence farmers, and caused disruption to the trade and nomadic migration routes, which 
added two million people in need of humanitarian assistance.27  
The existence of Janjaweed not only provided Khartoum with the necessary confidence 
that it could control the militia; it also allowed the government to wage a large war with a 
minimum of cost. At Khartoum’s disposal, the Janjaweed would serve loyally as a 
counterinsurgency force that could be self-sustained from looting, taking land and possessions 
from civilians. Both parties attained a remarkable record of violations against civilians, including 
killings, torture, and hostage taking. Attacks also targeted the peacekeepers, humanitarian aid 
workers and aid convoys, which severely limited humanitarian access to the Darfuris in need.  
                                                 
26 See Crisis Group Africa Report No. 134, Darfur’s New Security Reality, 26 November 
2007 on rising violence in IDP camps.  
27 International Crisis Group attributed these casualties to the result of war, famine and 
diseases. “Famine in the war-torn communities is Khartoum objectives that has been largely 
achieved through manipulation, diversion, and denial of international humanitarian relief” (ICG 
Africa Report No. 54, 2). See the report for more insightful explanation on denial of 
humanitarian aid as a weapon of war. 
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Human Rights Watch reported that between January and April 2008, four humanitarian 
workers were killed, 102 humanitarian vehicles were hijacked, 29 drivers of WFP delivering 
food aid were missing, fourteen humanitarian premises were attacked and four humanitarian 
compounds were destroyed and looted. UNAMID, hampered by the lack of required personnel 
capacity and vital military equipment, was unable to intervene on a number of occasions as 
civilians were attacked. Rodolphe Adada, Joint Special Representative of UNAMID said, “we 
are here to keep a peace that doesn’t exist.”   
 
Sudan’s Socio-Economic Situation 
Sudan’s ravages of two civil wars did not create enough turmoil for Khartoum to cease 
hostilities and to comply with the demands of three peace agreements; the CPA, the DPA, and the 
ESPA. Wealth from oil exploration had secured Khartoum, allowing it to wage war on three 
different fronts: in the South, in the West (in all three Darfuris’ region) and in the East. However, 
the economic forecast for Sudan in 2011 and beyond is uncertain, since eighty percent of 
oilfields are now under the control of South Sudan. The Human Development Index showed that 
despite Sudan’s ability to sustain its war trajectory, its people’s quality of life regressed for 
decades, showing no significant achievement in three basic dimensions. In addition, the 
Corruption Perception Index showed that Khartoum, while waging war and arming the 
Janjaweed, failed to distribute wealth to its population and to reform governance.  
Sudan began exporting crude oil in 1999 and oil production contributed to the boost of 
Sudan’s economic growth post 2000. The following figures show Sudan’s economic growth in 
term of GDP per capita. Sudan recorded a 6.1 percent growth in 2003, rocketed to nine percent in 
2007, decreased to 4.2 percent in 2009 and slightly increased to 5.2 percent in 2010. Sudan might 
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receive a significant share of oil income from South Sudan for the use of Sudan’s pipelines, 
refineries, and port facilities.  
The International Monetary Fund pressed Sudan in the early 1990s to strengthen its 
macroeconomic reforms. Since 1997, Sudan has been implementing macroeconomic reforms 
recommended by the International Monetary Fund. China is Sudan’s largest economic partner, 
with forty percent share in oil. In return, China sold small arms used by Khartoum for its military 
operation in Darfur and Southern Kordofan. Such economic interdependence placed China as 
one of Sudan’s powerful allies in the UN Security Council. Russia, which has benefited from 
Sudan’s $21 million expenses on military spending, also stands to veto any strong UN Security 
Council action to punish Sudan.  
Given the importance of oil in Sudan’s economic growth, Khartoum has been using very 
repressive approaches to secure its exploration anywhere in the South region. Khartoum 
launched indiscriminate attacks on civilians, displacing them. Eyewitness accounts confirmed 
that the tactics included the abduction of women and children, gang rape, aerial bombing 
supported by helicopter gunships, destruction of humanitarian camps, burning of villages, and 
attacks that targeted international humanitarian workers and aid convoys.28  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 See ICG Africa Report No. 39, God, Oil, and Land, Changing the Logic of War in 
Sudan, January 2002 and ICG Africa Briefing, Sudan’s Oilfields Burn Again: Brinkmanship 
Endangers the Peace Process, 10 February 2003; and ICG Africa Report No. 54, Ending 
Starvation as a Weapon of War in Sudan, 14 November 2002 for further references.  
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Figure 3.2 
The Republic of Sudan GDP Per Capita (in PPP US$) 1998 - 2010 
 
Sudan’s GDP per capita kept increasing since 2004. However, such positive economic 
growth is not equivalent with its Human Development Index, which shows signs of deteriorating 
since 2006. The Human Development Index is a composite measure of the average achievements 
of a country in three basic dimensions: a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy at 
birth); knowledge (measured by adult literacy rate and the combined gross enrollment ratio for 
primary, secondary, and tertiary schools); and a decent standard of living (measured by GDP per 
capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) US Dollars). All data on GDP per capita in PPP US$ and 
Human Development Index were obtained from UNDP Human Development Report 1998–2010.  
Figure 3.3 
The Republic of Sudan Human Development Index 1998 – 2010 
 
53 
 
 
Sudan’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for seven consecutive years shows that 
corruption is rampant and prevalent. Transparency International publishes CPI annually, ranking 
countries on a scale from 10 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). Rankings derive from perceived 
levels of corruption as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys on corruption in 
the public sector.  
Table 3.4 
Corruption Perceptions Index of The Republic of Sudan 
Year Ranking Countries Ranked Rating 
2004 122 145 2.2 
2005 144 158 2.1 
2006 156 163 2.0 
2007 172 179 1.8 
2008 173 180 1.6 
2009 176 180 1.5 
2010 172 178 1.6 
 
Naming and Shaming on Darfur and the International Criminal Court’s Indictment29  
The conflict in Darfur showed the inadequacy of legal enforcement taken by the 
international community to stop the death toll among civilians. The United Nations Security 
Council proved incapable of aiming sanctions at Khartoum due to the dividing line of the P5 in 
regard to the Darfur issue. Various Transnational Advocacy Networks pushed for a more 
systemic approach to conflict resolution in Darfur. Their method is to name and shame the 
perpetrators and to bring the case into ICC jurisdiction.  
The international spotlight on the Darfur conflict began with a report by one of the 
transnational advocacy networks, the International Crisis Group (ICG), when it released a report 
in June 2003, titled “Sudan’s Other Wars,” which raised early warning alarms of potential deadly 
                                                 
29 See Crisis Group Africa Report No. 152, Sudan: Justice, Peace and the ICC, 17 July 
2009 for more insightful on Khartoum’s engagement with ICC’ indictment.  
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conflicts in Darfur. ICG launched a Sudan project in 2001 and released the first report, “God, 
Oil, and Country: Changing the Logic of War” on January 28, 2002. To this date, the ICG has 
released 42 reports and called the conflict in Sudan “the most extreme and long-running example 
in the world of using access to humanitarian aids as an instrument of war” (ICG Africa Report 
No. 54, i).30  
Out of 42 reports, sixteen covered the conflict in Darfur and provided dozen of 
recommendations to multiple parties involved in conflict resolution methods; namely, the United 
Nations Security Council; the African Union; the United States, European Union and other states 
willing to support the AU initiatives; the Government of Sudan, the international supporters of 
the IGAD process, especially the observer countries (US, UK, Norway, and Italy); and the Arab 
League. ICG also made calls to the belligerent parties to uphold international human right and 
international humanitarian law and to oblige compliance to the humanitarian agreements signed 
by the parties to the conflict.  
                                                 
30 Even though Darfur is Sudan’s most pressing regional issue, additional attention is 
needed in Kordofan, where the African tribes of Misseriya suffered from area’s dissolved in 
return to a demographic balance more favorable to NCP political power and the African tribes of 
Nuba that have been subjected to displacement policies, land expropriation and culture 
homogenization. In the far North, the construction of dams has displaced and angered several 
communities. In the East, where CPA’s implementation did not address the grievances of the 
people of one of Sudan’s most politically marginalized, with a worse humanitarian situation than 
parts in Darfur, would also need attention. Both South Kordofan and Blue Nile are to hold 
referendum regarding their constitutional future within the Republic of Sudan. While Abyei Area 
is due to hold referendum in 2011 on whether to join the Republic of South Sudan or remain part 
of the Republic of Sudan. Khartoum and Eastern Front rebels group signed Eastern Sudan Peace 
Agreement in October 2006. The peace accord regulated power and wealth sharing in the east 
region, marked by the appointment of three Eastern Front officials to have share in government 
positions. Like other two peace agreements, the implementation of Eastern Sudan Peace 
Agreement to end conflict remained unsatisfied. See the following sources for in-depth 
discussion on Sudan’s other civil wars: ICG Africa Briefing, Sudan’s Other Wars, 25 June 2003; 
Crisis Group Africa Report No. 102, Sudan: Saving Peace in the East, 5 January 2006; Crisis 
Group Africa Report No. 145, Sudan’s Southern Kordofan Problem: The Next Darfur, 21 
October 2008; and Crisis Group Africa Program Report No. 154, Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: 
Countering Insecurity in South Sudan, 23 December 2009.  
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Despite the early warnings made by ICG, widespread media coverage just started when 
United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, in March 
2004, called Darfur “the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis”. Many more transnational 
advocacy networks joined the campaign afterward. Amnesty International publicly shamed 
Khartoum for atrocities in Darfur in its Human Rights in Republic of Sudan Annual Report for 
four consecutive years. Amnesty International also cited other reports condemning human rights 
violations in Darfur in its annual country report; in six reports in 2007, four reports in 2008, one 
report in 2009, and one in 2010. 
Human Rights Watch, a New York based independent organization dedicated to 
defending and protecting human rights, published 23 reports on Darfur. In the report titled 
“Entrenching Impunity, Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur,” 
published on December 2005, Human Rights Watch engaged in publicly naming and shaming 
the following individuals as perpetrators of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed 
in Darfur: 
1. Khartoum Officials 
- Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, incumbent President of Sudan 
- Ali Osman Mohammed Taha, incumbent First Vice President of Sudan 
- Major General Abdel Rahim Mohammed Hussein, former Minister of the Interior, 
Representative of the President for Darfur (2003-2004), incumbent Minister of 
Defense 
- Major General Bakri Hassan Salih, former Minister of Defense, incumbent Minister 
for Presidential Affairs 
- Abbas Arabi, former Chief of Staff of Sudanese Armed Forces  
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- General Salah Abdallah Gosh, Director of National Security and Intelligence Service 
- Ahmad Muhammad Harun, former Minister of State for the Interior of the 
Government of Sudan, former Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs of Sudan, 
and the incumbent Governor of Southern Kordofan 
2. Current or Former Regional Officials 
- Al Tayeb Abdullah Torshain, former Commissioner of Mukjar, 2003-2005 
- Al Haj Attar Al Mannan Idris, Governor of South Darfur, mid 2004 to present 
- Ja’afar Abdel el Hakh, former Commissioner of Garsila (prior April 2004), incumbent 
Governor of West Darfur 
- Major General Adam Hamid Musa, Governor of South Darfur, 2003 to mid 2004 
- Major General (Ret.) Abdallah Safi el Nour, former Governor of North Darfur (2000-
2001), National Minister in Khartoum (2003-2004) 
3. Military Commanders 
- Brigadier General Ahmed Al Hajir Mohammed, Commander of the 16th Infantry 
Division forces used in the attacks on the villages of Marla, Ishma, and Labado in 
December 2004 
- Major General Al Hadi Adam Hamid, Chief of Border Intelligence Guard; key liaison 
to Janjaweed militias 
- Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Wahid Said Ali Said, Commander of the 2nd Border 
Intelligence Guard based in Misteriya, which supports military operations in and 
around Kebkabiya 
- Major Gaddal Fadlallah, commander in Kutum 
4. Militia Leaders 
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- Abdullah Saleh Sabeel (went by nom de guerre Abu Ashreen), leader of a militia base 
in Kebkabiya 
- Sheikh Musa Hilal, key militia recruiter and coordinator 
- Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (went by nom de guerre Ali Kushayb) 
- Mustapha Abu Nuba, tribal leader of Riziegat sub-clan in South Darfur 
- Nazir Al Tijani Abdel Kadir, tribal leader of the Misseriya militia based in Niteiga, 
South Darfur 
- Mohammed Hamdan, Rizeigat militia leader allegedly involved in Adwah attack and 
looting in November 2004 
The permanent members of United Nations Security Council were divided on the Darfur 
issue, though around 37 resolutions passed since 2004. Resolution 1556 passed on July 30, 2004, 
demanded that the GoS disarm the Janjaweed and cease attacks on civilians.  It also imposed an 
arms embargo. Pursuant to Resolution 1564, adopted on September 18, 2004, the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur was established to investigate reports of international 
humanitarian law and human rights violations. The commission reported to the Security Council 
in January 2005, contending that there was reason to believe that crimes against humanity and 
war crimes were committed in Darfur, thus recommending the referral of the case to the ICC.   
On March 31, 2005, the UN Security Council formally referred the situation in Darfur to 
the Prosecutor of International Criminal Court through Resolution 1593. In December 2005, the 
United Nations Panel of Experts, which was established by Resolution 1591, recommended the 
imposition of sanctions on seventeen individuals, ten government officials, two Janjaweed 
militia leaders and five Darfur rebel commanders, for their role in committing human rights 
violations and impeding the peace process. Immediately after the referral, Office of the 
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Prosecutor conducted two months of preliminary examination, followed by several missions to 
Khartoum from 2005 to 2007, to assess the complementarity status of Sudan. ICC Prosecutor 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo later announced that national proceedings in the Sudan on those crimes 
did not exist.  
On May 16, 2006, Resolution 1672 was adopted to impose sanctions on four Sudanese 
individuals over their involvement in the Darfur conflict. Travel bans and the freezing of assets 
were aimed at Sheikh Musa Hillal, the Janjaweed leader in Darfur; Major General Mohammed 
Elhassen, the commander of Sudan’s western military region; Gabriel Abdul Kareen Badri, the 
commander of the National Movement for Reform and Development; and Adam Yacub Shant, 
the head of SLM/A.  
In September 2007, the Panel of Experts submitted a new report describing breaches of 
international humanitarian law, violations of the arms embargo by all the warring parties, and 
extending the list of individuals recommended for sanctions. The panel also reported that the 
government of Sudan painted the military planes white to disguise them as United Nations or 
African Union aircraft.  
Transnational advocacy networks (TANs), International Crisis Group, Amnesty 
International, and Human Rights Watch, are among those raising voice against the serious human 
rights violations that took place during war in Darfur. They argued that Khartoum made peace 
with the SPLA only because the Government of Sudan perceived such a strategy as the most 
effective way to head off mounting pressure over Darfur. However, the situation on the ground 
showed negative trends, which made transnational advocacy networks keep their eyes on Darfur.  
These organizations contributed in various ways to the development of justice in Darfur. 
ICG was the first to ring warning bells, informing the international community about the human 
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rights violations committed by Khartoum in Darfur. Later, ICG, Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International supplied the international community with extensive reports covering the 
systematic and widespread violations committed by both parties in Darfur. It was hoped the 
reports would prompt countries that could exert their influence on Khartoum. Three out of six 
individuals indicted by the ICC were previously named and shamed by Human Rights Watch in 
their December 2005 report (See Appendix H – List of TANs Reports and UNSC Resolutions for 
complete list of the reports). 
Many more organizations also joined the advocacy campaigns, such as Save Darfur 
Coalition, American Jewish World Service, the Genocide Intervention Network, and Students 
Taking Action Now.  Calling for more humanitarian aid for the devastating civilian casualties and 
for increasing the role of international peacekeepers, they held a series of rallies, which the 
largest one on April 2006 in Washington, D.C.  
Understanding the pattern of committing human rights violations with impunity that 
Khartoum maintained for years, the networks approached the United Nations Security Council to 
pass a resolution to refer to the situation in Darfur to the ICC, the only mechanism to limit the 
abuse of GoS’ sovereignty, since Sudan itself is not a state party to the Rome Statute.31 Later, the 
Court was able to name the alleged perpetrators and charged them with the following crimes, 
such as mentioned in the arrest warrants: 
1. Ahmad Muhammad Harun, former Minister of State for the Interior of the Government of 
Sudan (prior to July 2005), Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs of Sudan (July 
2005 – May 2009), and the Governor of Southern Kordofan (May 2009 – present).  
The arrest warrant listed 42 counts on the basis of his individual criminal responsibility 
                                                 
31 See Part II note 17 for the explanation on the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction.  
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under articles 25(3)(b) and 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute, including: 
- “Twenty counts of crimes against humanity: murder (article 7(1)(a)); persecution 
(article 7(1)(h)); forcible transfer of population (article 7(1)(d)); rape (article 7(1)(g)); 
inhumane acts (article 7(1)(k)); imprisonment or severe deprivation of liberty (article 
7(1)(e)); and torture (article 7(1)(f)); 
- Twenty-two counts of war crimes: murder (article 8(2)(c)(i)); attack against the 
civilian population (article 8(2)(e)(i)); destruction of property (article  8(2)(e)(xii)); 
rape (article 8(2)(e)(vi)); pillaging (article 8(2)(e)(v)); and outrage upon personal 
dignity (article 8(2)(c)(ii))” (ICC-PIDS-CIS-SUD-001-002/11_Eng, n.p.) 
2. Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, alleged leader of the Janjaweed militia. 
The arrest warrant listed 50 counts on the basis of his individual criminal responsibility 
under articles 25(3)(a) and 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute, including: 
- “Twenty-counts of crimes against humanity: murder (article 7(1)(a)); persecution 
(article 7(1)(h)); deportation or forcible transfer of population (article 7(1)(d)); 
imprisonment or severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental 
rules of international law (article 7(1)(e)); torture (article 7(1)(f)); persecution (article 
7(1)(h)); and inhumane acts of inflicting serious bodily injury and suffering (article 
7(1)(k)); 
- Twenty-eight counts of war crimes: violence to life and person (article 8(2)(c)(i)); 
outrage upon personal dignity in particular humiliating and degrading treatment 
(article 8(2)(c)(ii)); intentionally directing an attack against a civilian population 
(article 8(2)(e)(i)); pillaging (article 8(2)(e)(v)); rape (article 8(2)(e)(vi)); and 
destroying or seizing the property (article  8(2)(e)(xii))” (ICC-PIDS-CIS-SUD-001-
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002/11_Eng, n.p.) 
3. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, incumbent President of the Republic of Sudan, 
incumbent head of National Congress Party (NCP), and commander in-chief of the Sudan 
Armed Forces (SAF). The arrest warrant listed ten counts on the basis of his individual 
criminal responsibility under articles 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute as an indirect 
perpetrator/co-perpetrator including: 
- “Five counts of crimes against humanity: murder (article 7(1)(a)); extermination 
(article 7(1)(b)); forcible transfer of population (article 7(1)(d)); torture (article 
7(1)(f)); and rape (article 7(1)(g));  
- Two counts of war crimes: intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population 
as such or against individual civilians not taking part in hostilities (article 8(2)(e)(i)); 
and pillaging (article 8(2)(e)(v));  
- Three counts of genocide: genocide by killing (article 6-a); genocide by causing 
serious bodily or mental harm (article 6-b); and genocide by deliberately inflicting on 
each target group conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical 
destruction (article 6-c)” (ICC-PIDS-CIS-SUD-02-002/11_Eng, n.p.) 
4. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Chairman and General Coordinator of Military Operations of the 
United Resistance Front. Pre-Trial Chamber I considered that he was responsible as a co-
perpetrator or an indirect co-perpetrator for three war crimes under article 25(3)(a) of the 
Rome Statute:  
- “Violence to life in the form of murder, whether committed or attempted, within the 
meaning of article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Statute: 
- Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installation, material, units or 
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vehicles involved in a peacekeeping mission within the meaning of article 8(2)(e)(iii) 
of the Statute;  
- Pillaging within the meaning of article 8(2)(e)(v) of the Statute” (ICC-PIDS-CIS-
SUD-03-002/11_Eng, n. p.) 
5. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, Commander-in-Chief of Justice and Equality 
Movement Collective-Leadership, one of the components of the United Resistance Front. 
6. Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, former Chief of Staff of SLA-Unity and currently 
integrated into Justice and Equality Movement. 
Pre-Trial Chamber I considered that both Abdallah Banda and Saleh Jerbo were 
responsible as co-perpetrators for three war crimes under article 25(3)(a) of the Rome 
Statute:  
- “Violence to life within the meaning of article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Statute;  
- Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units and 
vehicles involved in a peacekeeping mission within the meaning of article 8(2)(e)(iii) 
of the Statute;  
- Pillaging within the meaning of article 8(2)(e)(v) of the Statute” (ICC-PIDS-CIS-
SUD-04-001/11_Eng, n. p.) 
On May 2, 2007, arrest warrants were issued for Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali 
Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman. Bahr Idris Abu Garda appeared voluntarily on May 17, 2009. 
Two arrests warrants were issued on separate occasions for the incumbent President of the 
Republic of Sudan, the first sitting head of state indicted by the ICC. The development of Omar 
Al Bashir’s case indeed was a very interesting one. On July 14, 2008, the ICC Prosecutor 
submitted an application for the issuance of an arrest warrant for Omar Al Bashir for five counts 
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of crimes against humanity, two counts of war crimes, and three counts of genocide.  
On March 4, 2009, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued the first arrest warrant, confirming the 
charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and left behind the charges of genocide 
arguing that there was no reasonable ground to support Omar Al Bashir dolus specialis motives. 
On February 3, 2010, in response, the Prosecutor appealed for the inclusion of genocide charges 
in the arrest warrant.  The Appeals Chamber found that the Pre-Trial Chamber I “had applied an 
erroneous standard of proof when evaluating the evidence submitted by the Prosecutor.” 
Following the standard of proof as identified by the Appeals Chamber, the second arrest warrant 
was issued on July 12, 2010 for three counts of genocide committed against the Fur, Masalit, and 
Zaghawa ethnic groups.  
The charge of genocide against the incumbent President of Sudan was not something that 
was without controversy. In February 2004, the International Association of Genocide Scholars 
was the first to declare that the conflict in Darfur was genocide. In September 2004, the US 
Secretary of State termed the conflict in Darfur genocide and claimed it was the worst 
humanitarian crisis of the 21st century. Moreover, the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act, 
which was signed into law by President George W. Bush on October 13, 2006, imposed sanctions 
against the perpetrators of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in order to support 
peace efforts in Darfur.  
Amnesty International was among others who refused to use the term ‘genocide’ and 
went by ‘the grave human rights abuses’ terminology. The United Nations, possibly in trying to 
mediate conflicts of interest among the permanent members of the Security Council regarding 
Darfur, stated that “mass murder of civilians have been committed by the Janjaweed, but not 
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genocide.”32 
On February 8, 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber I ruled that there was insufficient evidence to 
precede Abu Garda to trial. On April 23, 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber I also declined the 
prosecutor’s application to appeal the decision. However, both decision do not preclude the 
Prosecutor from requesting confirmation of the charges against Abu Garda if it is supported by 
additional evidence. Both Abdallah Banda and Saleh Jerbo also appeared voluntarily on June 16, 
2010. On March 7, 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber I confirmed the charges against the two and 
committed them to trial.    
                                                 
32 Section 3, Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, “Congress makes the 
following findings: 
(1) On July 23, 2004, Congress declared, ‘the atrocities unfolding in Darfur, Sudan, are 
genocide’. 
(2) On September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell stated before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate, ‘genocide has occurred and my still be occurring in Darfur’, 
and ‘the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility’.  
(3) On September 21, 2004, in an address before the United Nations General Assembly, 
President George W. Bush affirmed the Secretary of States’ finding and stated, ‘[a]t this hour, 
the world is witnessing terrible suffering and horrible crimes in the Darfur region of Sudan, 
crimes my government has concluded are genocide’. 
(4) On July 30, 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 
1556 (2004), calling upon the Government of Sudan to disarm the Janjaweed militias and to 
apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates who have incited and 
carried out violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and establishing a 
ban on the sale or supply of arms and related materiel of all types, including the provision of 
related technical training or assistance, to all nongovernmental entities and individuals, 
including the Janjaweed. 
(5) On September 18, 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council 
Resolution 1564 (2004), determining that the Government of Sudan had failed to meet its 
obligations under Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004), calling for a military flight ban 
in and over the Darfur region, demanding the names of Janjaweed militiamen disarmed and 
arrested for verification, establishing an International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to 
investigate violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, and threatening 
sanctions should the Government of Sudan fail to fully comply with Security Council 
Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1564 (2004), including such actions as to affect Sudan’s 
petroleum sector or individual members of the Government of Sudan. …” 
Amnesty International recalled, “The grave human rights abuses…cannot be ignored any longer, 
nor justified or excused by a context of armed conflict” (ENGAFR540082004, February 3, 
2004).   
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On July 2008, Khartoum started to seek alliance for Bashir’s case deferral by 
approaching the Arab League, the African Union, and the Organization of Islamic Conference. 
During 2008 UN General Assembly, it gained support from the Group of 77 non-aligned 
countries. The permanent members of UN Security Council were divided into three divisions; 
UK and France, the strongest Security Council allies of the ICC, who refused to support the 
Article 16 deferral of investigation for the sake of Sudan’s politics; Russia and China, who had 
always been ready to veto any strong Security Council action to punish Sudan; and the US which 
was reluctant to take a leadership role on deferral since it itself is not a party to the Rome Statute.    
On February 2009, it was clear that Khartoum could not secure Bashir’s deferral from the 
Security Council. Consequently, Khartoum retaliated by expelling thirteen INGOs, and dissolved 
three local NGOs. These humanitarian agencies were covering the needs of people in Darfur, 
Kassala and Red Sea, Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. This consisted of food 
provisions and safe drinking water for 1.1 million people and healthcare for 1.5 million people 
(Crisis Group Africa Report No. 152, 18).33  
Sudan has been engaging in civil war since before independence. The conduct of war, 
which has been attributed to the marginalization of non-Arab origins, caused many casualties and 
sufferance of civilians. These people were displaced from their community and their land. 
Khartoum gave the land to Arab origin tribes later. By doing this, Khartoum could secure its 
political position and win the majority vote it needed to stay in power. Understanding that the 
state officials practiced ill behaviors with impunity for decades, Sudan does need to obtain major 
                                                 
33 They were Action Contre la Faim (ACF), Care International, CHF International, 
International Rescue Committee (IRC), Mercy Corps, MSF Holland and France, Norwegian 
Refugee Council, Oxfam GB, Solidarite, PATCO, Save the Children Fund UK and US, the 
Khartoum Centre for Human Rights and Environmental Development, the Sudan Social 
Development Organization (SUDO), and the Amal Centre for the Rehabilitation of Victims of 
Torture in Khartoum.  
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policy changes. Therefore, the fight against impunity should be at the core of its peace process.  
Khartoum had reluctantly lobbied against the initiatives to include justice for the crimes 
committed in Darfur in the CPA, Darfur Peace Agreement, and in Eastern Sudan Peace 
Agreement of October 2006. For major policy changes to happen, any easy trade-offs between 
peace and justice should be refused, and any political and economic accommodations at the 
expense of a national judicial process should be repudiated. ICG notes the culture of impunity in 
Sudan, saying: 
“A more systemic approach should be developed within a conflict resolution […] so as to 
advance improvements on impunity and reformed governance. This is essential to foster 
the kind of sustainable peace that cannot be built by temporary ceasefires, cooption of 
spoilers into state institutions and quick-fix power-sharing agreement. Justice requires 
[…] criminal prosecution of individuals, […] the establishment of a credible system and 
culture of accountability through transitional justice mechanism that make the fight 
against impunity a key component of a reformed governance system” (Crisis Group 
Africa Report No. 152, 28).  
 
B. The Democratic Republic of the Congo 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), or Congo-Kinshasa to differentiate it 
from the neighboring Republic of the Congo, gained independence from Belgium on June 30, 
1960. It borders the Central African Republic and South Sudan to the north; Uganda, Rwanda 
and Burundi and is separated from Tanzania by Lake Tanganyika in the east; and Zambia and 
Angola to the south. DRC was in war with five of them during the Second Congo War.  
Its official name was formerly, in chronological order, the Congo Free State (1877-1908), 
Belgian Congo (1908-1960), Congo-Léopoldville, Congo-Kinshasa and Zaire. It is the second 
largest country in Africa and the fourth most populous nation in the continent, with a population 
of nearly 71 million. DRC is widely considered to be one of the richest country in the world in 
natural resources, yet its citizens are among the poorest in the world, tiered the last in IMF, 
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World Bank, and CIA World Factbook’s rankings of PPP per capita. It has the second lowest 
nominal GDP per capita, ahead of Burundi (IMF 2010), the third lowest ahead of Somalia and 
Burundi (World Bank 2010), and the second lowest ahead of Somalia (CIA World Factbook 
2010). 
 
Congo’s Political Instability34 
The Rwandan genocide that took place between April and June 1994 caused over a 
million Hutu to seek refuge in the DRC. Among them were up to 100,000-armed men from 
former Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) and Interahamwe, Rwandan Hutu militia forces, 
which were responsible for killing the Tutsis. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees treated 
the massive refugee exodus simply as a humanitarian crisis and provided them with basic needs. 
The ex-FAR/Interahamwe joined forces with local Hutu militias and Mobutu’s army (Forces 
Armées Zaïroises or FAZ) to launch a campaign against Congolese ethnic Tutsis in Kivu 
province, accusing them of supporting the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and to launch 
incursions against the Tutsi-led regime in Rwanda.  
After two years of continuing arguments with the United Nations regarding their 
treatment by the militiamen, the new Rwandan government took the matter into its own hands. 
The year 1996 marked when the neighboring Rwandan genocide and civil war’s tensions came to 
DRC. Rwandan armies, which were joined by a coalition of Burundi, Eritrea, Angola and 
Uganda, went under the cover of a small group of Tutsi militia to dismantle the Hutu refugees’ 
camp in North Kivu. By the time the Rwandans finished their march across DRC, they had killed 
                                                 
34 The content of this section is summarized from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/dr-congo.aspx, 
and various ICG Policy Briefings and Reports mentioned in the bibliography. 
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200,000 to 300,000 Hutu refugees; the vast majority of the victims were women, old people and 
children.  
Meanwhile, the same coalition also aimed to overthrow the government of Colonel 
Joseph-Désiré Mobutu who had been in power since November 1965. Some Mobutu longtime 
opposition forces joined them and the newly expanded coalition became known as the Alliance 
des Forces Démocratique pour la Libératio du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL) led by Laurent-Désiré 
Kabila. Leaving the North Kivu, they marched toward Kinshasa and forced Mobutu to flee the 
country in May 1997.  Kabila named himself president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
By the end of the First Congo War, the AFDL committed serious massacres against Rwandan 
Hutus in refugee camps and Congolese Hutus, whom they accused of supporting the Rwandan 
genocide.   
On July 27, 1998, President Kabila asked all of the foreign military forces that had helped 
him overthrow Mobutu to return to their countries. This broke apart alliances that once had 
brought Kabila to power. New alliances then emerged that revolved around the question of 
whether Kabila should be kept in power.35 Rwandan troops in DRC retreated to Goma and 
launched a new rebellion named Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) to fight 
Kabila. The Ugandan and some Burundian government troops created another rebel movement 
called the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC) led by the Congolese warlord Jean-Pierre 
Bemba. On August 2, 1998, the two declared their rebellion against President Kabila.   
Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Chad supported the DRC militarily, while Libya and 
                                                 
35 Paul Kagame, the leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and later rose to power as 
Rwandan president effectively ended the Rwandan genocide in July 1994, was the leader of the 
coalition of five nations who took part in the First Congo War. Laurent-Désiré Kabila was his 
chosen man and during the time Kabila was the president of the DRC, it was the Rwandans who 
occupied all civilian and military key positions. Kagame’s intention to control its big neighbor 
later was responded by Kabila’s calling for foreign troops fully withdrawal from the DRC.  
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Sudan made financial contributions.. The United Nations Security Council, meanwhile, adopted 
Resolution No. 1279 on November 30, 1999.  It was to establish a peacekeeping force, the 
United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), in response to the 
outbreak of the second civil war.  
The continental war in Congo was inseparably intertwined with internal problems facing 
other countries.  As a result, five foreign civil wars and one interstate war were waged on DRC 
territory.  These were in addition to the DRC’s own internal conflict. First, it was war between 
Rwanda and the ex-FAR and Interahamwe.  After the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, they sought 
refuge at North Kivu, DRC, and launched incursions into Rwanda against the Kigali Tutsi-led 
regime.  
Second, it was war between Uganda and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).  
Composed of former soldiers of Idi Amin Dada, they carried out several bloody attacks against 
Kampala from Congolese territory. At the same time, Yoweri Museveni faced two other guerrilla 
movements at home, West Nile Bank Front, which was active in northwest Uganda, and Lord 
Resistance Army (LRA). Indeed, Uganda’s presence in DRC collided with Kampala’s 
involvement in Sudan’s civil war. Uganda supported Southern Sudan Liberation Army (SPLA) 
that was fighting Khartoum. To retaliate against the threat posed by Kampala, Sudan supported 
all three Ugandan anti-Museveni guerrilla movements. Sudan accused Uganda of supporting the 
SPLA, who were recruited from among 350,000 refugees from South Sudan living in the north 
of Uganda (ICG Congo Report No. 2, 19).  
Third, it was war between Burundi and the Forces for the Defense and Democracy (FDD) 
whom carried out their movement from South Kivu. Fourth, it was war between Congo-
Brazzaville and militia backing the deposed former President Lisouba. Fifth, it was war between 
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Angola and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA).  Sixth was 
Angola’s interstate war with Congo-Brazzaville. Luanda always took to the offensive against any 
neighboring governments that supported UNITA, sometimes contributing forces to support a 
coup d’état. Jóse Eduardo dos Santos of Angola contributed to the military force that brought 
General Sassou Nguesso back to power in 1997. The former elected Congo-Brazzaville 
president, Pascal Lisouba who led the country from 1992-1997, provided ‘safe passage’ for 
UNITA diamond production.  
Internally, Kabila had to deal with movements challenging his leadership. The 
Banyamulenge forged an alliance with Rwanda under the umbrella of Rassemblement Congolais 
pour la Démocratie (RCD). Kabila supported Pascal Lisouba during the civil war in Congo-
Brazzaville that brought Sassou Nguesso back to power. In return, Nguesso supported Union des 
Républicans Nationalistes pour la Libération  (UNFL), Mobutu’s former Special Presidential 
Division forces, which moved to Congo-Brazzaville after Mobutu was ousted from power and 
later joined the coalition against Kabila.  
On the one hand, an alliance formed to oust Kabila from power.  It included the RCD, 
MLC, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.  The rationale was that his support for guerilla groups 
opposed to governments of former allies had increased regional instability. On the other hand, 
there was Kabila resisting the rebel movement with the support from Angola, Zimbabwe, 
Namibia and Chad, accusing the first party of being foreign adventurists in Congolese territory 
for natural resources.36  
                                                 
36 During the First Congo War, Angola assisted the AFDL headed by Kabila and reaped 
the benefits of Mobutu discontinued support for UNITA, and this alliance was maintained during 
the Second Congo War. The Angolan Armed Forces (Forças Armadas Angolanas or FAA) with a 
force of 110,000 men had been fighting in its civil war since 1975. Thus had a longer experience 
of combat than any of the other belligerent countries. One equation of the Second Congo War 
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The prolonged war took place until 2003.  It was known as the “African World War.”  It 
involved seven African nations and about 25-armed groups. By 2008, the war had killed 5.4 
million people and displaced millions seeking asylum in neighboring countries.37 On July 10, 
1999, heads of state of DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and the Minister of 
Defense of Angola signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Jean-Pierre Bemba signed the 
agreement on August 1, 1999, while 50 representatives of RCD signed the agreement on August 
31, 1999.  
The agreement was designed to seal sustainable peace in the Central African region and 
within the DRC.  It formed the basis for38: 
1) Immediate cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a Joint Military Commission 
tasked with: (i) investigating ceasefire violations, (ii) working-out mechanism to disarm 
the identified militias, and (iii) monitoring the withdrawal of foreign troops. 
2) Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR) 
                                                                                                                                                             
was the economic benefits reaped from the war. The northeastern provinces of Congo are 
extremely rich with gold, diamonds, copper, zinc, tin, uranium, zinc, silver and coltan. DRC’s 
40-kilometers which stretch to the Atlantic coastline, are marked by oil installations and oil 
reserves, which is under control of Luanda.  
37 See ICG Kivu Report No. 1, North Kivu into the Quagmire? An Overview of the 
Current Crisis in North Kivu, 13 August 1998; ICG Congo Report No. 2, Congo at War, Briefing 
on the Internal and External Players in the Central African Conflict, 17 November 1998; ICG 
Democratic Republic of Congo Report No. 4, Africa’s Seven-Nation War, 21 May 1999; ICG 
Congo Report No. 3, How Kabila Lost His Way: The Performance of Laurent Désiré Kabila’s 
Government, 21 May 1999; and ICG Africa Report No. 26, Scramble for the Congo, Anatomy of 
an Ugly War, 20 December 2000 for further references.  
38 See the following reports for more insightful explanation: ICG Democratic Republic of 
the Congo Report No. 5, The Agreement on A Cease-fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: 
An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace, 20 August 1999; ICG Africa Report No. 
27, From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo, 16 March 2001; ICG Africa 
Briefing Paper, Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in Conflict Prevention, 12 June 2001; ICG 
Africa Report No. 37, The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: Political Negotiation or Game Bluff, 16 
November 2001; ICG Africa Report No. 38, Disarmament in the Congo: Jump-Starting DDRRR 
to Prevent Further War, 14 December 2001; and ICG Africa Report No. 44, Storm Clouds Over 
Sun City: The Urgent Need to Recast The Congolese Peace Process, 14 May 2002.  
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of armed groups took part in the war. 
3)  The deployment of UN Charter VII force tasked with disarming the belligerents, 
collecting weapons from civilians, and providing humanitarian assistance and protection 
to the IDPs 
4) The establishment of Inter-Congolese Dialogue to forge political dispensation in the 
DRC.  
Upon the assassination of Laurent-Désiré Kabila on January 26, 2001, his son Joseph 
Kabila took office.  He committed to continuing the peace efforts instigated by his father. In 
April 2001, United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) deployed 
16,000 peacekeepers to support the implementation of peace talks. However, the conflict was re-
launched in January 2002 by ethnic clashes in the northeast. Both Uganda and Rwanda halted 
their withdrawal and sent in more troops. In December 2002, all Congolese belligerents and 
political groups signed The Global and Inclusive Agreement in Sun City, South Africa, ushering 
in a transitional government that would be in power from 2003 to 2006. 
In fact, the transitional government that was sworn in on June 30, 2003, was a political 
compromise between the main armed groups39: 
- Joseph Kabila’s Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC) 
- Jean-Pierre Bemba’s Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC) 
- Azarias Ruberwa’s Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma  
                                                 
39 It is important to note that the appointed vice presidents did not reflect the same share: 
Vice President Yerodia Abdoulaye Ndombasi of Kabila’s coalition, Vice President Azarias 
Ruberwa of RCD-Goma, Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba of MNC, and Vice President Arthur 
Zahidi Ngoma representing political opposition. However, the 36 ministries’ post, 25 vice 
ministers, 500 deputies, 120 senators, nine military regional commanders, and ten provincial 
governor were distributed among the main armed groups, political opposition and civil society. 
See Appendix B The Members of the Transitional Government, Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 
34, 14-15.  
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(RCD-G) 
- Mbusa Nyamwisi’s Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement de 
Libération (RCD-ML) 
- Roger Lumbala’s Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-National  
(RCD-N) 
- Mai-Mai militias from the east of DRC   
The transitional government was labeled  “The 1+4.” This reflected the power sharing 
agreement. According to the 2003 transitional constitution, the executive branch was vested in a 
61-member cabinet, headed by a President and his quartet of vice presidents.40  
After some delays, first-round presidential elections were held on July 30, 2006. They 
were marked by the eruption of violent clashes in Kinshasa between Kabila and Bemba 
supporters after neither gained a majority in first-round vote (44.81% of the vote was for Kabila, 
and 20.03% of the vote for Bemba). Kabila was inaugurated as the elected president on 
December 3, 2006 after securing 58.05% vote in the run-off.  
Kabila’s weak government allowed conflict and human rights abuses to endure.41 In 
Kivu, the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a new alliances of ex-FAR, 
Interahamwe, and post-genocide rebels recruited from the Banyamulenge and refugee camps in 
                                                 
40 See Crisis Group Africa Briefing, Back to the Brink in the Congo, 17 December 2004; 
Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 34, A Congo Action Plan, 9 October 2005; Crisis Group Africa 
Report No. 104, Security Sector Reform in the Congo, 13 February 2006; and Crisis Group 
Africa Report No. 108, Congo’s Elections: Making or Breaking the Peace, 27 April 2006 for in-
depth discussion of the situation in DRC during the transitional government period.  
41 See the following reports for further references of post-election’s DRC: Crisis Group 
Africa Briefing No. 42, Securing Congo’s Elections: Lessons from the Kinshasa Showdown, 2 
October 2006; Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 44, Congo: Staying Engaged after the Elections, 
9 January 2007; Crisis Group Africa Report No. 128, Congo: Consolidating the Peace, 5 July 
2007; and Crisis Group Africa Report No. 151, Congo: A Comprehensive Strategy to Disarm the 
FDLR, 9 July 2009. 
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Tanzania, posted another security threat to Rwanda.42 To counter attack, Laurent Nkunda created 
a rebel movement named National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP).  
Despite DRC referral of Ituri crisis to the ICC, violence still erupted and caused a refugee 
crisis at the end of October 2008.43 Joseph Kony's Lord Resistance Army (LRA) expanded their 
movement to cover DRC by setting up camps in the Garamba National Park in northeast DRC. 
In northern Katanga, the Mai-Mai posed a serious threat to the local population.44 The MONUC, 
now numbering to 22,000 troops, was criticized for failing to protect civilians from human rights 
violations committed by both FDLR and FDRC. The war is one of the world's deadliest conflicts 
since World War II. 
 
Congo’s Socio-Economic Situation45  
The DRC has suffered from systemic corruption since Mobutu came to power, and the 
legacy of poor governance prevailed in Laurent-Désiré Kabila and Joseph Kabila’s presidency. 
The Congo’s two wars between 1996-1997 and 1998-2003 had enhanced the erosion and 
collapse of state institutions. On July 26, 2005, the United Nations Expert Panel on the Arms 
Embargo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo reported that between sixty to eighty percent 
                                                 
42 See ICG Africa Report No. 56, The Kivus: The Forgotten Crucible of the Congo 
Conflict, 24 January 2003; ICG Africa Briefing, Pulling Back from the Brink in the Congo, 7 
July 2004; Crisis Group Africa Report No. 91, The Congo’s Transition is Failing: Crisis in the 
Kivus, 30 March 2005; and Crisis Group Africa Report No. 133, Congo: Bringing Peace to North 
Kivu, 31 October 2007 for deeper insight into Kivu’s conflict.  
43 See ICG Africa Report No. 64, Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri, 13 June 
2003; ICG Africa Report No. 84, Maintaining Momentum in the Congo: The Ituri Problem, 26 
August 2004; and Crisis Group Africa Report No. 140, Congo: Four Priorities for Sustainable 
Peace in Ituri, 13 May 2008 for further references.   
44 See Crisis Group Africa Report No. 103, Katanga: The Congo’s Forgotten Crisis, 9 
January 2006 for an in-depth discussion of Katanga’s mineral conflict.   
45 See Crisis Group Africa Report No. 114, Escaping the Conflict Trap: Promoting Good 
Governance in the Congo, 20 July 2006, and Crisis Group Africa Report No. 150, Congo: Five 
Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy, 11 May 2009 for further references.  
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of customs revenues were embezzled, one fourth of the national budget was not properly 
accounted for, and millions of dollars were misappropriated in the army and state-run companies.  
These problems had a deliberate impact on the humanitarian situation. The unpaid 
soldiers harassed and intimidated civilians, committed looting, and abducted the villagers. The 
civil servants also committed the practice of extorting money from the population. Over ninety 
percent of taxes had been arbitrarily created and were illegal along the trade routes in Equateur 
and Bandundu provinces. The higher rank of military and government officials fought over 
control of mineral extractions. IDPs had almost no health service to rely on, and the death of 
civilians remained high in the aftermath of the civil war.  There were more than 1,000 casualties 
daily.  
One clear cost of civil war is a reduction in economic growth.  One year of conflict 
reduces a country's growth rate by 2.2%. On average, each civil conflict lasts for seven years, so 
the conflict would reduce the economic growth by 15% by the end of the war. It would take 
roughly ten years to regain the pre-war growth rates (Collier and Hoeffler 2006, 40). The country 
also increased military spending by about 1.8%. 
Conflict also has a severe effect on human health. One way to quantify this effect is using 
the Disability Adjusted Life-Years (DALYs),  “a measure of the total number of people affected 
and the period for which their disability lasts” (Collier and Hoeffler, 42). The estimated figure is 
five million DALYs net present value of health costs when the hostilities start. If each DALY is 
valued at the same amount of per capita income in many at-risk countries, which is around $1, 
000 then the economic cost of harm to human health is around $5 billion. (Collier and Hoeffler, 
42).   
The DRC became an aid-dependent country.  Its net official development assistance 
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(ODA) was greater than ten percent of GNP during 1990-1997 when Joseph-Désiré Mobutu was 
in power. As of year 2003, the net ODA received amounted to 94.9% of GDP, which was equal to 
$ 5.381 billion. However, this poring of foreign aid to Congo-Kinshasa did not improve the GDP 
per capita of its population nor its inhabitant's quality of life, such as shown in the following 
graphs. 
Figure 3.5 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo GDP Per Capita (in PPP US$) 1998 - 2010 
 
 
Internationally, there is a consensus that human development should be the primary 
objectives of aid. The consensus was reiterated in March 2002, during the International 
Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico. The participants agreed to 
make aid one of the building blocks of a new global partnership for poverty reduction. This 
linked aid effectiveness and the Human Development Index.  Data on GDP per capita and HDI 
were obtained from UNDP Human Development Report 1998 – 2010. 
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Figure 3.6 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo Human Development Index 1998 - 2010 
 
 
 
The Global and Inclusive Agreement, which was able to bring belligerent parties into 
governing the DRC along with civil society and political opposition, ushered in donors’ 
reengagement with sponsoring reforms in a post-civil war Kinshasa. However, the performance 
of the transitional government was marked by intense political infighting, a lack of 
accountability, corruption, and a failure to gain stability. Casella and Eichengreen (1996) studied 
the effect of foreign aid on economic stabilization. They argued that foreign aid transferred 
sufficiently early in the game leads to earlier stabilization, while delay was destabilizing and 
encouraged further postponement of reforms. This result does not hold for DRC. In order for 
foreign aid to have an impact on economic stabilization, political stability must be secured first 
(see Collier 2007).  
Donors have been treating corruption in DRC as a technical problem. Therefore, they 
emphasized improving data management systems, the creation of legislations and program’s 
training.  They avoided the political aspects of strengthening parliaments and courts, anti-
corruption and auditing bodies. Such approaches had shown failures to promote good 
governance in three consecutive years. In 2003, two third of the national budget was spent 
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outside normal procedure. Even though the figure had decreased to 27 percent in the following 
year, the presidency overspent by $18 million. Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba alone exceeded 
his budget by some $11 million. Also in 2004, an audit of state payroll revealed that the pay slips 
did not match the civil servant database. In 2005, government revenue amounted to only ten 
percent of GDP. Spending concentrated in the capital only, with less than two percent disbursed 
outside Kinshasa. In addition, DRC’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for seven consecutive 
years shows that Kabila failed to fight corruption and promote good governance.  
Table 3.7 
Corruption Perceptions Index of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Year Ranking Countries Ranked Rating 
2004 133 145 2.0 
2005 144 158 2.1 
2006 156 163 2.0 
2007 168 179 1.9 
2008 171 180 1.7 
2009 162 180 1.9 
2010 164 178 2.0 
 
Collier and Hoeffler provided the most comprehensive estimate of the cost of civil war, 
$64 billion annually.46 They favored the targeted use of aid or international military intervention 
to prevent recurring conflicts. However, there are some challenges to these options. Poorly 
targeted aid, for example, can actually do great harm to the prospects for peace when it merely 
                                                 
46 The figure is calculated from various national and regional cost of civil war, which 
amount to 250% of initial GDP times $19.7 billion of average GDP of conflict-affected low-
income countries, which is equal to $49.25 billion. If we recall the cost of conflict harm to 
human health, which is equal to $5 billion then the total cost would be $54.25 billion (rounded to 
$54 billion). This is already a significant figure, but there is a conflict trap, the likelihood of 
countries that have just experienced a civil war to have further conflict. Therefore, over the 
fifteen years period needed for the risk to reach the pre-war level again, the additional discounted 
cost would be $10.2 billion. Hence, the final calculation would be $54 billion + $10.2 billion = 
$64.2 billion, rounded to $64 billion.  
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bolsters dictatorships and allows inequality to grow. We might want to recall the period of 1971-
1997 when Joseph-Désiré Mobutu was in power and Zaire became a kleptocracy. He got the 
support of the US and Western powers amid his severe human rights violations, political 
repression, and corruption. By 1984, Mobutu was said to have $4 billion in his personal Swiss 
bank account, an amount close to the country's national debt. International aid in the form of 
loans gave personal gains to Mobutu while he failed to provide public goods.  
Valuable natural resources, meanwhile, provide ways for rebel movements’ self-
financing. DRC is the most dangerous place in the world to be a woman or girl, as warring 
parties have used rape as a weapon of war, in order to fight for control over minerals. The most 
brutal rapes were committed by the FDLR. Medecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported that 75 
percent of all rape cases it dealt with worldwide were in eastern Congo. UNICEF and related 
medical centers reported treatment of 18,505 persons for sexual violence in the first month of 
2008, thirty percent of which were children. North Kivu Provincial Sub-commission on Sexual 
Violence reported that an estimated ninety percent of minors in prison in eastern Congo have 
been convicted of rape.47  
DRC is the world's largest producer of ore. It is a mineral that produces Tin (Sn), 
Tungsten (W), Tantatum (Ta), and Gold (Au) that end up being used in electronic devices such as 
cell phone. Raise Hope for Congo, for example, is working to get the Conflict Mineral Trade Act 
to become law in the United States.  If so, it would be the strongest effort to date to address the 
scourge of conflict minerals.  
 Recall the moment when the world was alerted to the problem of blood diamonds as a 
                                                 
47 François Grignon, Rape as a Weapon of War in Congo, published in Spiegel 
International, 11 June 2009, retrieved from http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-
africa/dr-congo/rape-as-a-weapon-of-war-in-congo.aspx 
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funding source for rebel movements. In response, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
was put in place to ensure that the diamonds purchased by buyers were not fueling violence in 
Africa. Certification introduces a two-tier market where uncertified goods are sold at a 
discounted price. This appears to have been at least partly responsible for the collapse of the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and UNITA in Angola.  
 UN peacekeeping missions are also limited. MONUC has been present in DRC since 
April 2001 and now amounts to 22,000 troops. It was heavily criticized for causing civilian 
suffering, the failure to neutralize FDLR and delaying long-awaited security sector reform 
(SSR).  
DRC is one of the countries with the highest rate of child soldiers worldwide. Amnesty 
International reported that despite some 5,000-child soldiers waiting for reintegration assistance 
at the end of 2007, the number of children serving with armed groups remained high. The 
FARDC formally ended the recruitment of child soldiers in 2004. Nonetheless, in 2009, an 
estimated 3,000 to 4,000 children remained in the ranks of Congolese army units and foreign 
army groups.  
From 2007 to 2011, DRC always ranked among the top ten in the Failed State Index. 
Kindornay, et al (2009) weighed in the stabilizing and destabilizing factors of DRC's armed 
conflict, governance and political instability, militarization, population heterogeneity, 
demographic stress, economic performance, human development, environmental stress, and 
international linkages, and came out with three scenarios predicting the future of the DRC.   
 The ‘best-case scenario’ would reflect in conflict reduction that would decrease the 
military spending. Thus, more funds would be allocated to provide basic services for the 
inhabitants. FARDC and the Rwandan government's joint efforts would be able to reduce the 
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operational capacity of FDLR. CNDP would have to be disarmed and integrated into FARDC. 
Altogether, this would increase Tutsi minorities’ involvement in the political process. As the 
result of conflict reduction, sexual violence and child soldiers’ practices would be significantly 
decreased. 
 The ‘most-likely scenario‘ would reflect in the persistence of low-intensity conflict. 
Rebel groups refuse to recognize the authority of the central government. Thus conflict could be 
reignite at any time. That is why defense spending remains a priority for government. The FDLR 
would continue to operate, creating a stumbling block for the DRC and Rwandan government's 
joint efforts. Any attempts to integrate former rebel soldiers into FARDC would further 
destabilized the unity of the government’s armed forces. Mitigation of human rights abuses 
would be difficult for alleviation of the problem faces major difficulties.  
 The ‘worst-case scenario’ would reflect in the increasing tensions between Jean-Pierre 
Bemba, the leader of the major opposition party, and Joseph Kabila’ supporters. Ethnic tensions 
in the eastern province would continue rising with the unsuccessful repatriation of Hutu militias 
and refugees back into Rwanda. DRC-Rwanda government’s joint effort would fail to disarm 
FDLR. Later, DRC-Rwanda government relationship would face a breakdown. Re-emergence of 
conflict would increase human rights violations. Conflict minerals would continue because of the 
DRC government’s failure to gain greater control over its sovereign territory. A community 
devastated by conflict would become a perfect supplier of frustrated youth open to being 
recruited as combatants. Altogether, it would increase future conflict.  
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Naming and Shaming on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the International 
Criminal Court 
DRC has been devastated by the continental war and needed more than the promise of 
reform to move forward. Joseph Kabila, the incumbent President of the DRC, made the referral 
of his country to the ICC during his presidency in the transitional period. The referral would 
externalize the political costs of prosecution to the ICC, and provide a powerful mechanism to 
discredit enemies and reshape the domestic political landscape. In addition, DRC also shows 
cooperation with the Court by transferring individuals indicted to the ICC. Only by doing this, 
could reconciliation of DRC’s divided communities be achieved 
The effort to broker a peace agreement in the DRC began soon after the Second Congo 
War broke out, on August 8, 1998. The neighboring states, regional organizations such as African 
Union and SADC, and the Francophone had led constant diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the 
continental war waged in the DRC. A total of 23 peace initiatives preceded the signing of Lusaka 
Ceasefire Agreement on July 10, 1999.  
The war in DRC added fuel to the fire in the region: Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, Central African Republic.  It also purportedly destabilized the 
countries of Eastern and Southern Africa: Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, 
Ethiopia, and Eritrea (ICG DRC Report No. 4, 34). Consequently, the engagement of the 
Security Council since early on was unavoidable.  
The Security Council adopted Resolution 1234 on April 9, 1999, demanded an immediate 
cessation of hostilities, a withdrawal of foreign-armed groups and reestablishment of the 
government’s authority. Resolution 1279 adopted on November 30, 1999, was to establish the 
United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). On February 24, 
83 
 
 
2000, the Security Council expanded MONUC’s mandate to monitor the peace process of the 
Second Congo War by adopting Resolution 1291.  
The request to establish a panel of experts on June 2, 2000, submitted by the President of 
the Security Council to the Secretary General, emerged subsequent to various reports on 
activities of illegal exploitation of resources in the DRC. On July 31, 2000 the Secretary General 
notified the President of the Security Council on the establishment of the Expert Panel on the 
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo.  
On January 16, 2011, the panel published its first report. Ms. Safiatou Ba-N’Daw from 
Côte d’Ivoire who chaired the panel and worked together with Mr. François Ekoko (Senegal), 
Mr. Mel Holt (USA), Mr. Henri Maire (Switzerland), and Mr. Moustapha Tall (Senegal) 
confirmed the allegation that the Congo’s resources had contributed to sustaining and prolonging 
the war in Congo (Grignon 2004, 45). Therefore, the finding uncovered the self-financing 
advantages of Kigali and Kampala’s presence in the DRC, though both countries emphasized the 
necessity to obtain a security buffer zone. 
Kigali covered a large part of its occupation-defense budget from the resources exploited 
from the DRC territory under RCD control. The war provided the senior military ranks with 
extraordinary economic benefits. President Museveni, the incumbent commander-in-chief, 
perceived the benefits, as sufficient reward to keep the army leadership loyal to his presidency. 
Equally important, the panel documented and illustrated how the looting of Congo’s riches by 
Zimbabwe and its Congolese government associates were under the cover of the war effort.  
The 2003 All Inclusive Peace Agreement allowed the establishment of a parliamentary 
commission with mandate to review all mineral extraction contracts signed during the two wars. 
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The commission, headed by Christophe Lutundula, submitted the “Report of the Parliamentary 
Commission on the Examination of the Validity of Contracts Signed During the 1996/1997 and 
1998 Wars” in June 2005. The report revealed that the management of natural resources had 
worsened during the transition period and identified serious flaws in the ongoing operation of 
mineral extractions. Consequently, the commission urged the government to review many 
contracts that were signed during the two wars, to cancel all contracts signed during the 
transitional period, and to hold new concessions until a new government was elected.  
The findings of the UN Panel of Experts and Lutundula Commission helped keep the 
issue of exploitation of resources in the DRC on the international agenda and to simultaneously 
keep the peace process moving forward. Soon after being named in the first report, Rwanda and 
Uganda accelerated their withdrawal from the DRC, to avoid the threat of sanctions.  
ICG field analysts had been monitoring the development of conflict in North and South 
Kivu since April 1998. On August 13, 1998, it published the first report titled “North Kivu, Into 
the Quagmire? An Overview of the Current Crisis in North Kivu.” To this date, ICG has 
published 34 reports regarding the conflict in DRC. Human Rights Watch has published 40 
reports while Amnesty International, in addition to its Human Rights in the DRC report 
published since 2008, had also published many reports (see Appendix H – List of TANs Reports 
and UNSC Resolutions). 
In 2006, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women showed concern regarding the transitional government’s inability 
to prioritize women’s rights and gender equality. UN Special Rapporteur on Violence, Yakin 
Ertürk, reported about ‘unimaginable brutality’ toward women in North and South Kivu. The 
armed group kidnapped women and girls, and used rape as a weapon of war, in order to fight for 
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control over minerals, or make them work as sexual slaves.  
In 2008-2009, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reported that gross 
human rights violations such as arbitrary execution, rape, torture and cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment are pervasive in the DRC, committed mostly by the army and police and 
intelligent services. In an effort to bring the war crimes suspect to justice, the government of the 
DRC, a state party to the Rome Statute, referred the situation in DRC to the ICC Prosecutor on 
April 19, 2004. President Joseph Kabila, who signed the request letter, asked the prosecutor to 
investigate crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were allegedly committed in the DRC 
since the entry into force of the Rome Statute.  
This decision was surprising considering that Kabila’s inner circles might be convicted 
for its participation in conflict minerals and other wrongdoing punishable under the crimes 
against humanity provision of the Rome Statute. Professor Burke-White argued that Kabila’s 
decision might rest primarily on cost benefit analysis of domestic politics and international 
pressure. He also notes: 
“[T]he very weakness of the national government and the politically charged nature of 
any judicial proceedings may well have led Kabila to refer the case to externalize the 
political costs of prosecution onto the ICC… Given that many key political actors are 
implicated in international crimes, criminal justice offers a powerful mechanism to 
discredit enemies and reshape the domestic political landscape” (Quoted in Lipscomb 
2011, 211).   
 
On June 23, 2004 the Office of the Prosecutor decided to open an investigation, initially 
with a focus on crimes committed in the Ituri. On July 4, 2004, the case was allocated to Pre-
Trial Chamber I. Further, the Court was able to name the alleged perpetrators and charged them 
with the following crimes, such as mentioned in their arrest warrants: 
1. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, alleged founder of Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) and the 
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Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC); alleged former Commander-
in-Chief of the FPLC since September 2002 and at least until the end of 2003; and 
alleged president of the UPC. He is allegedly responsible, as co-perpetrator, of war 
crimes consisting of: 
- “Enlisting and conscripting of children under the age of 15 years into the Forces 
Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC) and using them to participate 
actively in hostilities in the context of an international armed conflict form early 
September 2002 to June 2, 2003, punishable under article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Rome 
Statute; 
- Enlisting and conscripting children under age of 15 years into the FPLC and using 
them to participate actively in hostilities in the context of an armed conflict not of an 
international character from June 2, 2003 to August 13, 2003, punishable under article 
8(2)(e)vii) of the Rome Statute” (ICC-PIDS-CIS-DRC-01-004/11_Eng, n.p.) 
2. Bosco Ntaganda, former alleged Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Forces 
Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo  (FPLC); alleged Chief of Staff of the Congrès 
National pour la Défense du People (CNDP) armed group, active in North Kivu in the 
DRC. 
3. Germain Katanga, alleged commander of the Forces de Résistance Patriotiques en Ituri 
(FRPI). 
4. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, alleged former leader of the Front des Nationalistes et 
Intégrationnistes (FNI). 
Both Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui allegedly jointly committed, through 
other persons, within the meaning of article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute: 
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- “Three crimes against humanity: murder under article 7(1)(a) of the Statute; sexual 
slavery and rape under article 7(1)(g) of the Statute; 
- Seven war crimes: using children under the age of 15 to take active part in hostilities 
under article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Statute; deliberately directing an attack on a civilian 
population as such or against individual civilians or against individual civilians not 
taking direct part in hostilities under article 8(2)(b)(i); willful killing under article 
8(2)(a)(i) of the Statute; destruction of property under article 8(2)(b)(xiii) of the 
Statute; pillaging under article 8(2)(b)(xvi) of the Statute; sexual slavery and rape 
under article 8(2)(b)(xxii) of the Statute” (ICC-PIDS-CIS-DRC2-03-004/11_Eng, 
n.p.) 
5. Callixte Mbarushimana, alleged Executive Secretary of the Forces Démocratiques pour 
la Libération du Rwanda – Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR-FCA). 
Pre-Trial Chamber I considers that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he is 
criminally responsible under article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute for: 
- “Five counts of crimes against humanity: murder, torture, rape, inhumane acts and 
persecution; 
- Six counts of war crimes: attacks against the civilian population, destruction of property, 
murder, torture, rape and inhumane treatment” (ICC-PIDS-CIS-DRC-04-002/11_Eng, 
n.p.) 
In February 2008, the Prosecutor announced that the arrest of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui 
had closed the ICC investigation in Ituri. Prior to that, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, was transferred to 
the ICC on March 17, 2006, and Germain Katanga transferred to the ICC on October 17, 2007.  
Both were charged with perpetrating conflict in Ituri. Thomas Lubanga’s trial commenced on 
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January 26, 2009 and the closing oral statements took place on August 25-26, 2011. The Trial 
Chamber I would render the decision on whether or not the accused is guilty within a reasonable 
time after the presentation. Both Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui are undergoing Trial Chamber II. 
Pre-Trial Chamber I had issued a warrant of arrest for Bosco Ntaganda on August 22, 2006, 
while Callixte Mbarushimana’s confirmation of charges hearing is scheduled to start on 
September 16, 2011.  
Global Policy Forum, an independent policy watchdog headquartered in NY, is publicly 
naming and shaming the DRC for its engagement in diamond and mineral conflicts. Hundreds of 
reports are posted and freely accessible from the organizations’ website.  It attracts more than 
five million visitors annually and exposes how natural resources lie at the heart of civil wars, 
including in the DRC. Raise Hope for Congo advocated and conducted direct lobbying for the 
Conflict Mineral Trade Act to be passed by the US Congress.  
DRC has one of the highest rates of child soldiers worldwide, placing the country in an 
Amnesty International global campaign. DRC is also the most dangerous place in the world to be 
a woman or girl because the warring parties have excessively used rape as a weapon of war. 
Consequently, DRC is on the list of naming and shaming by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. This multifaceted conflict in DRC moved diverse and various 
TANs to put the DRC into the international spotlight. 
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PART IV 
ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NAMING AND SHAMING TO THE POWER OF ICC 
AND THE WAY FORWARD 
 
I argue that naming and shaming techniques work and show this in the two cases. I 
argued that publicity is an important power of the ICC.  Publicity provides transparency; lays the 
groundwork for a more vigorous and powerful diplomatic, economic and military response to 
perpetrators. It also develops a sense of legitimacy for State Parties to the Rome Statute. The 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg once reminded us, “Crimes against international 
law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who 
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”48  
The international community holds the perpetrators of human rights violations 
accountable for their action, and as Ratner et.al 2009 argued,  
“International crimes violate the most central norms of humanity, and all states should have a 
moral and political interest in seeing an effective remedy. Accountability, whether through 
prosecutions or otherwise, also serves a preventive purpose. It can signal to future violations 
of human rights that their actions will not simply be forgotten in some political compromise. 
The exact form of accountability is less important than the existence of some process for 
stigmatizing the offender, aiding the victim, informing the society, and ensuring that political 
settlements and transitions take account of human rights abuses – all were made possible 
through naming and shaming” (370).49  
 
The International Criminal Court is to be the deterrent for some of the worst crimes. 
Many scholars of international law and transitional justice argue that “holding perpetrators 
accountable, demonstrates the viability of the rule of law and human rights protections, thereby 
                                                 
48 “Judgment of the International Military Tribunal.” Trial of German Major War 
Criminals: Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, 
Part 22. London,1950. 447. Print. 
49 Emphasis added by the author.  
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should deter others from thinking that they are above the law” (Hillebrecht 2011, 10).50 Roach 
(2006) argues that a global deterrent effect is a critical starting point for understanding the 
politics of international criminal law. The ICC Statute, he added, “eliminates all existing national 
amnesty laws that have provided immunity to perpetrators of gross human rights violations” (2).  
Hillebrecht further argues that there are three main causal mechanisms by which action at 
the ICC could deter future abuses. The first is normative in nature. The second is the effect 
international law has on inspiring international action to restrain the atrocities. The third is a re-
calculation of perpetrators’ likelihood of accountability. The first two mechanisms put emphasis 
on the fact-finding and investigatory works of the ICC. As the ICC moves forward with its 
discovery of atrocities, the importance of exposing the abuses to the international community 
becomes necessary, since it provides transparency. Further, it would lay the groundwork for an 
extensive naming and shaming campaign, which would give leeway to more vigorous and 
powerful diplomatic, economic, and military sanctions.  
The transnational advocacy networks (TANs) such as International Crisis Group, Human 
Rights Watch, and Amnesty International were involved in a massive naming and shaming 
campaign aimed at the conflicts in Darfur and Congo-Kinshasa. International Crisis Group, an 
                                                 
50 Stephen M. Sheppard analogized the deterrent effect of the ICC to the speeding ticket 
that could be given at anytime. He argued, 
“I think about it this way, do you drive; do you have a car? Many people speed, when 
they speed and they are finally given the tickets, they can’t argue that there was no law 
because they have been able to speed all the other times. You don’t have to have one 
patrolman to proof there is a speed limit; you don’t need a patrolman every mile. Even 
without a patrolman, from time to time if anyone can get a ticket, it reminds us all that 
there is such a capacity. The fact there is speeder that does not mean there is no speed 
limit. So one of the things that people argued about implicitly in this is, ‘do we have to 
look to all these things to show it’s effective, to show it’s real?’ The answer is NO. All 
we need to know there is a speed limit, and from time to time the ticket can be given, 
even if it isn’t given, it can be given. That is enough for it to be effective. Because when 
the ticket is given, you don’t get much of an excuse.  You can say, ‘But they all sped!’ 
But nobody took you seriously” (Sheppard, 2011).  
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international NGO founded in 1995 and headquartered in Brussels, published Crisis Group 
briefings and reports as resources of advice to the governments of DRC and Sudan, the 
governments of mediating states, and intergovernmental bodies (such as the EU, AU, and UN). 
These briefings and reports contained recommendations on how to achieve resolution of the 
conflicts. 
Human Rights Watch, a NGO headquartered in New York City, has long adopted publicly 
naming and shaming of abusive governments through media coverage and direct exchanges with 
policymakers in their campaign. It constantly monitors human rights conditions in the DRC and 
Sudan, and other 78 countries around the world and publishes reports and news releases. Indeed, 
Human Rights Watch compiled a list of all the perpetrators of conflict in Darfur.  
Amnesty International, a London based worldwide movement, works to improve human 
rights through campaigning and international solidarity. Amnesty International does direct 
lobbying, conducts letter writing campaigns and targeted appeals, among other things, to put 
pressure on governments, armed groups, companies and intergovernmental bodies to uphold 
international human rights and humanitarian law. It also publishes country human rights reports 
annually and provides news releases.  
The US Department of State is also one of the key players in transnational advocacy 
networks. In compliance with Sections 116(d) and 502 (b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
as amended, and Section 504 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, the department is required to 
submit Country Reports on Human Rights Practices to the US Congress every year. The 
Department emphasizes, “the existences of human rights helps secure the peace, deter 
aggression, promote the rule of law, combat crime and corruption, strengthen democracy, and 
prevent humanitarian crisis.” 
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 The way in which the transnational advocacy networks worked to name and shame the 
perpetrators in both Sudan and the DRC confirmed what Kick and Sikkink (1998) described as a 
boomerang pattern.51 This suggests that domestic NGOs need transnational advocacy network to 
shine a powerful light on human rights abuses.  It also suggests the role that non-state actors 
could play in evoking human rights compliance.  
Background reports and press releases also have impact. Press releases are more likely to 
be short interventions by sending messages of breaking events to general publics in order to 
shape their perceptions. Individuals at the grass roots could mobilize support and put pressure on 
elected leaders to play more active roles in demanding that violating states comply with human 
rights. Background reports are for longer interventions.  They are usually based on in-depth 
country research, and target human rights professionals, academics, UN officials, donor 
countries, Western democratic states, decision makers at the regional and international level, and 
journalists.  
Naming and shaming by transnational advocacy networks allow more support and more 
pressure to be placed on violating states, or on the parties in the inner circle of conflict 
negotiations. Such patterns are especially effective when a particular state lacks a sufficient 
human rights movement that could contend domestic violations, such as the case in Darfur and 
DRC.  
Nonetheless, even as the number of ICC indictments in Africa increases, it will continue 
to be difficult for the Court to reach perpetrators in big or powerful countries.  It is important for 
the ICC’s effectiveness to go beyond naming and shaming if it is going to build legitimacy and 
respect (Sharp 2011).  
                                                 
51 See Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998) for more insightful explanation.  
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One-way to move forward with such issue is by re-designing the decision making process 
at the ICC. This requires a more efficient working relationship between the Assembly of State 
Parties and the ICC judiciary. The proposition is that “the creation of a decision-making body 
within the Assembly of State Parties whose task would be to address a humanitarian crisis in a 
manner that overcomes the time restrictions imposed by the principle of complementarity” 
(Roach, 172). The following table would provide details on the proposition. 
Table 4.1 
Types of Prevention in the ICC and Security Council 
Organs Non-Intervention Intervention 
ICC Cell 1 
Reputation 
Cell 3 
Admissibility 
Security Council Cell 2 
• Preventive Diplomacy 
• Economic Sanctions 
Cell 4 
• Use of Military Force 
• Stabilization 
• Rapid Deployment 
 
Reproduced from Roach 2006, 172.   
 
The ICC is clearly a key part of the debate on the effectiveness of international 
institutions. This is especially so when we think of the agenda setting and publicity that it already 
accomplished at the international level. The cases of Darfur, Sudan and the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo show that the ICC is effectively realizing its purpose: it gives voice to non-state 
actors like NGOs, regional actors, and international governmental organizations; it regularizes 
ways for international actors to be part of the process; it provides information to other 
stakeholders; and it names and shames the perpetrators of human rights violations. Hence, the 
ICC gives meaning to the cautious optimism that inspires liberal claims. As Roach (2006, 72-73) 
emphasized, 
“The desire for accountability, […], is not some cognitive picture per se, but an intrinsic 
and objective element of our moral experience. As moral beings, we assert this 
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objectivity through the institutional mechanism that embodies our fundamental 
conceptions of justice or the common good. It is in this respect that, as rationally human 
beings, we universally condemn the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity. It is 
also in this manner that the principles and rules of the ICC cannot be conceived as simply 
formalistic or hallow statements of moral accountability.”  
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APPENDIX A 
WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE   
 
2. For the purpose of this Statute, “war crimes” means: 
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the 
following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant 
Geneva Convention: 
(i) Wilful killing; 
(ii) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; 
(iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health; 
(iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; 
(v) Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a 
hostile Power; 
(vi) Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair 
and regular trial; 
(vii) Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful enforcement; 
(viii) Taking of hostages.    
(b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed 
conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the 
following acts: 
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against 
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; 
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not 
military objectives; 
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or 
vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to 
the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of 
armed conflict; 
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would 
be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military 
advantage anticipated; 
(v) Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or 
buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives; 
(vi) Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or having no 
longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion; 
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(vii) Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or of the military insignia and 
uniform of the enemy of the United Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems 
of the Geneva Conventions, resulting in death or serious personal injury; 
(viii) The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own 
civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all 
or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory; 
(ix) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, 
art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where 
the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives; 
(x) Subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party to physical mutilation 
or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are neither justified by 
the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in 
his or her interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health of 
such person or persons; 
(xi) Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or 
army; 
(xii) Declaring that no quarter will be given; 
(xiii) Destroying or seizing the enemy’s property unless such destruction or seizure be 
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war; 
(xiv) Declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and 
actions of the nationals of the hostile party; 
(xv) Compelling the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war 
directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent’s service 
before the commencement of the war; 
(xvi) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault; 
(xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons; 
(xviii) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gasses, and all analogous liquids, 
materials or devices; 
(xix) Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as 
bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced 
with incisions; 
(xx) Employing weapons projectiles and material and methods of warfare which are of 
a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which are 
inherently indiscriminate in violation of the international law of armed conflict, 
provided that such weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare are 
the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are included in an annex to this 
Statute, by an amendment in accordance with the relevant provisions set forth in 
articles 121 and 123; 
(xxi) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment; 
(xxii) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as 
defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, or any other form of 
sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions; 
(xxiii) Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain 
points, areas or military forces immune from military operations; 
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(xxiv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and 
transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions 
in conformity with international law; 
(xxv) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving 
them of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief 
supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions; 
(xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national 
armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities.  
(c) In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of 
article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the 
following acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including 
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat 
by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause: 
(i) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture; 
(ii) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment; 
(iii) Taking of hostages; 
(iv) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial 
guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable.  
(d) Paragraph 2 (c) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does 
not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. 
 
(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an 
international character, within the established framework of international law, namely, any 
of the following acts: 
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian populations as such or against 
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; 
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and 
transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions 
in conformity with international law; 
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or 
vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to 
the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of 
armed conflict; 
(iv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, 
art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where 
the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives; 
(v) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault; 
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(vi) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as 
defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, and any other form of 
sexual violence also constituting a serious violation of article 3 common to the four 
Geneva Conventions; 
(vii) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces 
or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities; 
(viii) Ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to the 
conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons 
so demand; 
(ix) Killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary; 
(x) Declaring that no quarter will be given; 
(xi) Subjecting persons who are in the power of another party to the conflict to physical 
mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are neither 
justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned nor 
carried out in his or her interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger 
the health of such person or persons; 
(xii) Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such destruction or 
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict; 
(f) Paragraph 2 (e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does 
not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that 
take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups. 
3. Nothing in paragraph 2 (c) and (e) shall affect the responsibility of a Government to maintain 
or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the unity and territorial integrity of the 
State, by all legitimate means.  
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FROM: Ro Windwalker 
 IRB Coordinator 
RE: New Protocol Approval 
 
IRB Protocol #: 10-12-353 
Protocol Title: Evaluating the International Criminal Court: Calling the Case of 
Darfur, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Review Type:  EXEMPT  EXPEDITED  FULL IRB 
Approved Project Period: Start Date: 12/14/2010  Expiration Date:  12/13/2011 
 
Your protocol has been approved by the IRB. Protocols are approved for a maximum period of 
one year. If you wish to continue the project past the approved project period (see above), you 
must submit a request, using the form Continuing Review for IRB Approved Projects, prior to the 
expiration date. This form is available from the IRB Coordinator or on the Compliance website 
(http://www.uark.edu/admin/rsspinfo/compliance/index.html). As a courtesy, you will be sent a 
reminder two months in advance of that date. However, failure to receive a reminder does not 
negate your obligation to make the request in sufficient time for review and approval. Federal 
regulations prohibit retroactive approval of continuation. Failure to receive approval to continue 
the project prior to the expiration date will result in Termination of the protocol approval.  The 
IRB Coordinator can give you guidance on submission times. 
If you wish to make any modifications in the approved protocol, you must seek approval prior to 
implementing those changes. All modifications should be requested in writing (email is 
acceptable) and must provide sufficient detail to assess the impact of the change. 
If you have questions or need any assistance from the IRB, please contact me at 120 Ozark 
Hall, 5-2208, or irb@uark.edu. 
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APPENDIX D 
US BILATERAL IMMUNITY OR “ARTICLE 98” AGREEMENTS  
 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court 
April 18, 2003 
In capitals around the world, U.S. government representatives are seeking bilateral immunity or 
so-called “Article 98” agreements in an effort to shield U.S. citizens from prosecution by the 
newly created International Criminal Court (ICC or Court). Dubbed “impunity agreements” by 
leading legal experts, these bilateral agreements, if signed, would provide that neither party to 
the accord would bring the other’s current or former government officials, military or other 
personnel (regardless of whether or not they are nationals of the state concerned) before the 
jurisdiction of the Court.  
Many legal, government and NGO representatives argue that the U.S. is misusing Article 98 of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; the provision of the ICC’s governing treaty 
that the U.S. is using to justify seeking such accords. Legal experts furthermore contend that if 
countries that have ratified the Rome Statute enter into such agreements, they would breach their 
obligations under international law.  
Q: Why is the U.S. seeking bilateral immunity agreements?  
A: The pursuit of bilateral immunity agreements is part of a long history of U.S. efforts to gain 
immunity for its citizens from the ICC. From 1995 through 2000, the U.S. government supported 
the establishment of an ICC, yet one that could be controlled through the Security Council or 
provided exemption from prosecution of U.S. officials and nationals. In 2001, the Bush 
Administration discontinued participation in ICC meetings and, on 6 May 2002, officially 
nullified the Clinton administration’s signature of the Rome Statute. Purportedly, the Bush 
Administration believes that the Court could be used as a stage for political prosecutions, despite 
ample safeguards included in the Rome Statute to protect against such an event.  
Contrary to assurances from high-level U.S. officials, the U.S. is not respecting the rights of 
States that have ratified or acceded to the Rome Statute. As it did in seeking an exemption for 
peacekeepers from the jurisdiction of the ICC through the Security Council, the U.S. government 
is using coercive tactics to obtain immunity from the jurisdiction of the ICC for its nationals. 
U.S. officials have publicly threatened economic sanctions, such as the termination of military 
assistance, if countries do not sign the agreement. In several instances, there have been media 
reports of the U.S. providing large financial packages to countries at the time of their signature of 
bilateral immunity agreements.  
Q: What is Article 98 of the Rome Statute?  
A: The nations that negotiated the drafting of the Statute did so with extensive reference to 
international law and with care to address potential conflicts between the Rome Statute and 
existing international obligations. The drafters recognized that some nations had previously 
existing agreements, such as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), which obliged them to 
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return home the nationals of another country (the “sending state”) when a crime had allegedly 
been committed. Thus Article 98 (2) was designed to address any potential discrepancies that 
may arise as a result of these existing agreements and to permit cooperation with the ICC. The 
article also gives the “sending state” priority to pursue an investigation of crimes allegedly 
committed by its nationals. This provision is consistent with the Statute’s complementarity’s 
principle, which allows the country of the nationality of the accused the first opportunity to 
investigate and, if necessary, try an alleged case of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against 
humanity.  
Q: What are the bilateral immunity agreements being sought by the U.S.?  
A: To date, several versions of these bilateral agreements have been proposed: those that are 
reciprocal, providing that neither of the two parties to the accord would surrender the other’s 
“persons” without first gaining consent from the other’; those that are non-reciprocal, providing 
only for the non-surrender to the ICC of U.S. “persons”; and those that are intended for states 
that have neither signed nor ratified the Rome Statute, providing that those states not cooperate 
with efforts of third-party states to surrender U.S. “persons” to the ICC.  
Q: Why do experts believe bilateral immunity agreements are in contravention of 
international law?  
A: Many governmental, legal and non-governmental experts have concluded that the bilateral 
agreements being sought by the U.S. government are contrary to international law and the Rome 
Statute for the following reasons:  
− The U.S. bilateral immunity agreements are contrary to the intention of the Rome Statute’s 
drafters. Delegates involved in the negotiation of Article 98 of the Statute indicate that this 
article was not intended to allow the conclusion of new agreements based on Article 98, but 
rather to prevent legal conflicts, which might arise because of existing agreements, or new 
agreements based on existing precedent, such as new SOFAs. Article 98 was not intended to 
allow agreements that would preclude the possibility of a trial by the ICC where the sending 
state did not exercise jurisdiction over its own nationals. Indeed, Article 27 of the Rome 
Statute provides that no one is immune from the crimes under its jurisdiction.  
 
− The U.S. bilateral immunity agreements are contrary to the language of Article 98 itself. The 
proposed agreements seek to amend the terms of the treaty by effectively deleting the 
concept of the sending state from Article 98(2); this term indicates that the language of 
Article 98(2) is intended to cover only SOFAs, Status of Mission Agreements (SOMAs) and 
other similar agreements. SOFAs and SOMAs reflect a division of responsibility for a limited 
class of persons deliberately sent from one country to another and carefully addresses how 
any crimes they may commit should be addressed.  
By contrast, the US-proposed bilateral immunity agreements seek immunity for a wide-
ranging class of persons, without any reference to the traditional sending state-receiving state 
relationship of SOFA and SOMA agreements. This wide class of persons would include 
anyone found on the territory of the state concluding the agreement with the U.S. who works 
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or has worked for the U.S. government. Government legal experts have stated that this could 
easily include non-Americans and could include citizens of the state in which they are found, 
effectively preventing that state from taking responsibility for its own citizens.  
− The U.S. interpretation of Article 98 is contrary to the overall purpose of the ICC. The U.S. 
government’s so-called “Article 98” agreements have been constituted solely for the purpose 
of providing individuals or groups of individuals with immunity from the ICC. Furthermore, 
the agreements do not ensure that the U.S. will investigate and, if necessary, prosecute 
alleged crimes. Therefore, the intent of these U.S. bilateral immunity agreements is contrary 
to the overall purpose of the ICC, which is to ensure that genocide, crimes against humanity 
and /or war crimes be addressed either at the national level or by an international judicial 
body.  
Q: What are the possible ramifications of the signature of these bilateral immunity 
agreements?  
A: States that sign these agreements would breach their obligations under the Rome Statute, the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and possibly their own extradition laws. In particular, 
States Parties to the Rome Statute that sign these agreements will breach Articles 27, 86, 87, 89 
and 90 of the Statute, which require states to cooperate with and provide assistance to the Court. 
These states will also violate Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which 
obliges them to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Statute. Finally, 
many states will likely violate their own extradition laws in signing such agreements, as states 
generally have much wider power to approve extraditions and surrenders of persons than the US-
proposed bilateral immunity agreements would allow.  
Q: Who has been approached with bilateral immunity agreements and with what result?  
A: Reports indicate that many countries from around the world, including close allies of the U.S. 
government, those seeking membership in NATO, and those in the Middle East and South Asia, 
have been targeted for approach and face extreme pressure to sign. John Bolton, US 
Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security, recently stated, “Using Article 98 of 
the Rome Statute as a basis, we are negotiating bilateral, legally-binding agreements with 
individual States Parties to protect our citizens from being handed over to the Court. Our 
negotiators have been engaged in bilateral discussions with several EU countries…. (And) 
several countries in the Middle East and South Asia. Our ultimate goal is to conclude Article 98 
agreements with every country in the world, regardless of whether they have signed or ratified 
the ICC, regardless of whether they intend to in the future.”  
As of April 16, 2003, twenty-seven countries were reported to have signed U.S. bilateral 
immunity agreements: Romania, Israel, East Timor, the Marshall Islands, Tajikistan, the 
Dominican Republic, Palau, Mauritania, Uzbekistan, Honduras, Afghanistan, Micronesia, 
Gambia, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, India, Nepal, Djibouti, Bahrain, Tuvalu, Georgia, Azerbaijan, 
Nauru, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tonga, Sierra Leone and Rwanda. National law in 
many of these countries requires that the agreement be ratified by parliament before becoming 
binding. Several countries, including members of the European Union, have conducted legal 
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analyses of these agreements and concluded that the proposed agreements are contrary to 
international law.  
Q: How does this effort tie in with the larger U.S. offensive against the Court?  
A: A number of relevant foreign policy directives from Washington have paved the way for the 
U.S. effort to gain exemption for its citizens from the ICC. On May 6, 2002, Marc Grossman, 
U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, announced that the current administration no 
longer considered it bound by the U.S. signature of the Rome Statute and did not intend to ratify 
the treaty. In May 2002, the U.S. first threatened to destabilize UN peacekeeping operations by 
promising to veto the UN mission in East Timor unless its military personnel were granted 
immunity from the ICC; the operation was renewed without such a provision. On July 12, 2002, 
the U.S. obtained a one-year renewable exemption for UN peacekeepers in the context of the 
Security Council debate on the UN mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. (The agreement was made 
retroactively effective to July 1, 2002.) On August 2, 2002, the last day before U.S. 
Congressional summer recess, President Bush signed the American Service Members' Protection 
Act, which authorizes the withdrawal of U.S. military assistance from certain non-NATO allies 
supporting the Court. The Act does, however, also include broad Presidential waivers.  
U.S. pressure on countries to support its bilateral immunity agreements intensified in mid-August 
2002 when U.S. officials, including Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S. Ambassador at Large for War 
Crimes Issues, indicated that the US relationship with NATO would change should his 
government fail to achieve its goal to secure broad non- surrender agreements. It has furthermore 
been reported that States seeking entry into NATO may be refused entry on the basis of a failure 
to sign a bilateral immunity agreement, although U.S. officials have publicly denied this claim.  
Q: Does a State that signs or ratifies a so-called “Article 98” agreement still have 
obligations to the ICC?  
A: Yes. Different stakeholders may disagree as to whether or not the so-called Article 98 
Agreements violate the terms of the Rome Statute and the scope of the Article as intended by its 
drafters. There is, however, little debate that Agreement signatories that are State Parties to the 
Rome Statute continue to have all prior obligations related to the ICC, except with regard to the 
specific terms of the Agreement. This includes the obligation to cooperate with the ICC in all 
investigations and prosecutions not involving the United States, and the opportunity to exercise 
national jurisdiction over the ICC crimes. Agreements signatories that are not yet States Parties 
to the Rome Statute may, and should be encouraged to, accede to the Rome Statute. It will be up 
to the ICC to decide whether or not the so-called Article 98 Agreements proposed by the United 
States are valid. Until such a determination is made, it is incumbent on States Parties to fulfill 
their obligations to the Court, and for Statute signatories to proceed with the accession process.  
Source : http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/164/28427.html 
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APPENDIX E 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
SUPRANATIONAL ELEMENTS  
 
Amitai Etzioni in Political Unification Revisited: On Building Supranational Communities 
defined the three elements of supranational as follows: 
1. Making of significant decisions by a body that is not made of national representatives and 
does not receive instructions from national governments.  
2. The decisions of the body are legally binding to the subject or participants. 
3. Individuals or other private parties may interact directly with the body and/or have legal 
obligations as stated above. 
International Criminal Court 
Aspect Supranational Element 
The Prosecutor may independently open investigations into 
cases of widespread violation of the Statute, such as war 
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, given the 
consent of the Pre-Trial Chamber. The Prosecutor may 
conduct investigations on the territory of a State Party 
(Article 53 and 54 of the Rome Statute) 
1 
Judges and members of the Office of the Prosecutor serve in 
a personal capacity and, though accountable to the Assembly 
of State Parties, act entirely independently and without 
instruction from national governments or any entity outside 
the Court (Article 36, 40 and 42 of the Rome Statute). 
1 
The Court has jurisdiction over persons, who are individually 
responsible and punishable for crimes under the Statute, such 
as war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity 
(Article 25 of the Rome Statute).  
2, 3 
The Pre-Trial Chamber may, after an investigation by the 
Prosecutor and on the application of the Prosecutor, issue a 
warrant of arrest for an individual if it has reasonable 
grounds to believe the individual has committed a crime 
under the Statute involved in the case under investigation by 
the Prosecutor (Article 58 of the Rome Statute).  
2, 3 
Arrest warrants are binding on State Parties, which are 
obligated to take steps to arrest the person in question 
immediately (Article 59 of the Rome Statute). 
2 
The Prosecutor of the Court, with the consent of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, consisting of three judges, is authorized to directly 
summon a person if there are reasonable grounds to believe 
the person committed an alleged crime under the Statute and 
a summons is sufficient to ensure the person’s appearance 
(Article 58 of the Rome Statute). 
3 
Individuals concerned have the right to challenge an arrest 3 
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warrant at the international level and apply at the 
international level for release pending trial (Article 60 of the 
Rome Statute) 
International Court of Justice 
Aspect Supranational Element 
The judges, who compose the Court, serve in a personal 
capacity, and though they are elected by the General 
Assembly on the advice of the Security Council, they are 
forbidden from receiving instructions from national 
governments or any entity outside the Court (Article 4 of the 
Statute of ICJ). 
1 
ICJ rulings in contentious cases are binding on the State 
Parties to the dispute. Thus, its decisions have the status of a 
treaty obligation for the State Party in question (UN Charter 
Article 94 Paragraph 1).  
2 
In case of non-compliance with decisions, the ICJ may refer 
a state party to the Security Council for enforcement, 
although this provision has never been used (UN Charter 
Article 94 Paragraph 2).  
2 
The ICJ Statute is a self-executing treaty, meaning 
(dependent on the constitutional provisions of the State Party 
in question) the provisions of the treaty are enforceable in 
the respective legal structures of State Parties, 
indistinguishable from national laws of the State Party. Taken 
with fact that its decisions are distinguishable in obligation 
from the Statute of the ICJ itself, the decisions of the ICJ 
have the status of national law in national courts. 
2 
The Court has the power in a contentious case to indicate any 
provisional measures for the preservation of the rights of 
either party (Article 41 of the ICJ Statute).  
2 
State parties to the ICJ Statute may declare acceptance of the 
jurisdiction of the Court in all cases. This means that any 
other state party having declared compulsory jurisdiction as 
well may bring the state party before Court for an alleged 
violation of international law. Should the ICJ decide to take 
up the dispute, the party is required to defend itself in a case 
before the ICJ and accept the decision of the Court. Certain 
treaties also confer on the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction over 
the treaty (Article 36 Paragraph 2 of the ICJ Statute).  
2 
 
Reproduce from: Supranational Aspects of International Organizations, retrieved from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supranational_aspects_of_international_organizations 
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APPENDIX F 
DARFUR’S NON - SIGNATORY MOVEMENTS 
 
JEM (Justice and Equality Movement)  Leader: Khalil Ibrahim 
The group refused to attend peace talks in Sirte, 
Libya on October 2007 and attributed their 
objection to “the presence of rebel groups that 
had no constituencies therefore deserved no place 
at the negotiating table.” 
JEM – Collective Leadership Leader: Bahr Idriss Abu Garda 
JEM - Azraq Leader: Idriss Ibrahim Azraq 
National Movement for Reform and 
Development 
Leader: Khalil Abdullah 
Another splinter group of Justice and Equality 
Movement 
SLA/AW (Sudan Liberation Army) Leader: Abdel Wahid Nur 
The group refused to attend peace talks in Sirte, 
Libya and demanded a deployment of 
peacekeeping force to stem the violence in Darfur 
SLA/AS Leader: Ahmed Abdelshaafie 
Breakaway faction from SLA/AW. SLA/AW 
commanders appointed Abdelshaafie as interim 
chairman to replace Abdel Wahid in July 2006. 
The group enjoyed strong support from the fur 
tribe 
SLA/G19  Leaders: Khamees Abdallah, Adam Bakhit, Jer el 
Neby 
Khamees had been the original leader of this 
group, but the group has since split into several 
factions. In Chad, Adam Bakhit continues to 
control a faction (in coordination with Khamees). 
Jar el Neby, with Suleiman Marajan and Osman 
Bushra, controls another faction in Darfur. 
SLA Unity Leader: Abdallah Yehya and other prominent 
figures (Sherif Harir, Abu Bakr Kadu, Ahmed 
Kubur) 
It is the group with the largest number or fighters. 
They opposed the peace talk for the same reason 
as JEM. 
SLA/MM defectors Groups that have defected from Minni Minawi, 
including those led by Salah “Bob” and Majzoub 
Hussein. 
RDFF/PFA (Revolutionary Democratic 
Front Forces/Popular Forces Army)  
Leaders: Salah Mohamed Abdulrahman Musa 
(also known as “Abu Surrah”), Yassin Yousuf 
“Arab” rebel movement. 
SFDA (Sudan Federal Democratic 
Alliance)  
Leaders: Ahmed Diraige, Sharif Harir 
Sharif Harir has reportedly left the SFDA to 
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become a full member of the SLA 
NRF (National Redemption Front) Leaders: Khalil Ibrahim, Sharif Harir, Ahmed 
Diraige, Khamees Abaker 
An alliance formed in Eritrea in June 2006. While 
initially effective as a military alliance, it has yet 
to find any political cohesion. 
United Revolutionary Force Front Leader: Alhadi Agabeldour 
SLA/NSF (Non-Signatory Faction) Made up of SLA/AW, SLA/AS, and SLA/G19, 
created as a way to have representation in the 
Ceasefire Commission. 
 
Reproduce from: Appendix B – Darfur Non-Signatory Movement, Crisis Group Africa Report 
No. 125, Darfur: Revitalising the Peace Process, 30 April 2007 and War in Darfur, retrieved 
from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Darfur 
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APPENDIX G 
MAJOR HUMANITARIAN AGREEMENTS BINDING ON SUDANESE PARTIES 
 
 The Republic of Sudan should comply fully with its obligations under the following 
international human rights treaties to which it becomes a party: the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Slavery Convention of 1926 
and the related Supplementary Convention, the International Convention on the Suppression 
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, the International Convention against Apartheid in 
Sports, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Related Protocol, and the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. 
 The Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 on the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, ratified by Sudan on 23 September 1957. Article 3.1 provides, “Persons taking 
no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their 
arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, 
shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on 
race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.” Sudan signed 
but has not ratified the 1977 supplementary protocol on the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) 
 Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) I Plan of Action, 14 March 1989. The first tri-partite 
agreement between the government, SPLA and UN states that “free access should be 
guaranteed to UN, NGO, and donor personnel participating in relief activities, enabling them 
to reach all civilian non-combatant populations in need of emergency relief through the 
Sudan.” 
 Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) II Plan of Action, 28 March 1990, states, “Relief and 
rehabilitation should be provided to civilians in need wherever they are deemed to be 
neutral.” 
 The OLS tri-partite agreement negotiated through IGAD in March and May 1994 states as a 
fundamental principle “the delivery of relief assistance to all needy populations regardless of 
their locations and further, that all parties to the conflict, agree to permit UN/OLS the free 
movement of food and non-food relief by air, land, river and rails as agreed by the UN/OLS 
and concerned parties.” 
 The “Security Protocol,” 18 November 1998, signed through the Technical Committee on 
Humanitarian Assistance (TCHA), made up of the government, the SPLA and the UN, 
recognises the need to ensure the security and safety of humanitarian aid personnel and 
property. 
 The “Minimal Operational Standards for Rail Corridors and Cross-line Road Corridors,” also 
signed 18 November 1998 through the TCHA, provides specific modalities for the delivery 
of humanitarian supplies from territory controlled by one party to territory controlled by 
another. 
 The “Beneficiary Protocol” on the Implementation of Principles Governing the Protection 
and Provision of Humanitarian Assistance to War Affected Civilian Populations, signed 
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through the TCHA on 15 December 1999, provides that “all humanitarian agencies 
accredited by the UN for humanitarian work in the Sudan shall have free and unimpeded 
access to all war-affected populations in need of assistance…” 
 Four agreements negotiated in December 2001 by the U.S. Special Envoy, former Senator 
Danforth, and designed to test the commitment of the parties for peace included “zones of 
tranquillity” to allow for emergency humanitarian intervention and access for disease 
eradication programs several days per month in areas of active fighting, as well as the 
establishment of an international commission to investigate and combat the practice of 
slavery in Sudan. The commission, known as “International Eminent Persons Group,” 
released its report on 22 May 2002. 
 The Nuba Mountains Cease-Fire Agreement of 19 January 2002, brokered by the US and 
Swiss governments and signed at Burgenstock, Switzerland, provides for humanitarian 
assistance through humanitarian corridors and an international monitoring team to be drawn 
from donor countries. Originally valid for six months, it was renewed in July 2002 for a 
further six-month period. 
 Agreement on a civilian monitoring protection force, 10 March 2002, negotiated by Senator 
Danforth and including pledges by the parties not to attack civilians or civilian facilities. 
 “Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army on Resumption of Negotiations on Peace in Sudan,” 15 October 
2002, includes cessation of hostilities, resumption of peace negotiations at Machakos under 
the IGAD framework, and (Clause 5) unimpeded humanitarian access. 
 “Meeting held on the Implementation of Clause 5 of the Machakos MoU on Unimpeded 
Humanitarian Access,” 26 October 2002, stipulates the modalities for unimpeded 
humanitarian access through 31 December 2002. 
 
Reproduce from: Appendix B – Major Humanitarian Agreements Binding on Sudanese Parties, 
ICG Africa Report No. 54, Ending Starvation as a Weapon of War in Sudan, 14 November 2002.   
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APPENDIX H 
LIST OF TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS REPORTS AND UNITED 
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON DARFUR AND THE DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO ISSUES 
 
List of International Crisis Group Reports on Darfur, Sudan: 
1) ICG Africa Briefing, Sudan’s Other Wars, 25 June 2003 
2) ICG Africa Report No. 76, Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis, 25 March 2004 
3) ICG Africa Report No. 80, Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur, 23 May 2004  
4) ICG Africa Report No. 83, Darfur Deadline: A New International Action Plan, 23 August 
2004 
5) Crisis Group Africa Report No. 89, Darfur: Failure to Protect, 8 March 2005 
6) Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 26, Do Americans Care about Darfur?, 1 June 2005 
7) Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 28, The AU’s Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps, 6 
July 2005 
8) Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 32, Unifying Darfur’s Rebels: A Prerequisite for Peace, 6 
October 2005 
9) Crisis Group Africa Report No. 99, The EU/AU Partnership in Darfur: Not Yet a Winning 
Combination, 25 October 2005 
10) Crisis Group Africa Report No. 105, To Save Darfur, 17 March 2006 
11) Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 39, Darfur’s Fragile Peace Agreement, 20 June 2006 
12) Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 43, Getting the UN into Darfur, 12 October 2006 
13) Crisis Group Africa Report No. 125, Darfur: Revitalising the Peace Process, 30 April 2007 
14) Crisis Group Africa Report No. 134, Darfur’s New Security Reality, 26 November 2007 
15) Crisis Group Africa Report No. 152, Sudan: Justice, Peace and the ICC, 17 July 2009 
16) Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 68, Sudan: Preventing Implosion, 17 December 2009 
17) Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 72, Rigged Elections in Darfur and the Consequences of a 
Probable NCP Victory in Sudan, 30 March 2010 
 
List of Human Rights Watch Reports on Darfur, Sudan: 
1) Darfur in Flames, Atrocities in Western Sudan, April 2, 2004 
2) Darfur Destroyed, Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan, 
May 6, 2004 
3) Addressing Crimes against Humanity and “Ethnic Cleansing” in Darfur, Sudan, A Briefing 
Paper to the UN Security Council, May 24, 2004 
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4) Darfur Documents Confirm Government Policy of Militia Support, A Human Rights Watch 
Briefing Paper, July 19, 2004 
5) Empty Promises? Continuing Abuses in Darfur, Sudan, August 11, 2004 
6) Sudan: Janjaweed Camps Still Active, Sanctions Urged for August 30 Deadline, August 27, 
2004 
7) “If We Return, We Will be Killed,” Consolidation of Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur, Sudan, 
November 14, 2004 
8) Targeting the Fur: Mass Killings in Darfur, January 21, 2005 
9) Sexual Violence and Its Consequences among Displaced Persons in Darfur and Chad, April 
12, 2005 
10) Submission to the 38th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and 
People’s Right, November 19, 2005 
11) Entrenching Impunity, Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur, 
December 8, 2005 
12) Sudan: Imperatives for Immediate Change, The AU Mission in Sudan, January 19, 2006 
13) Darfur Bleeds: Recent Cross-Border Violence in Chad, February 21, 2006 
14) Ensuring Protection in Darfur: The UN Mandate, April 21, 2006 
15) Darfur: Humanitarian Aid under Siege, May 8, 2006 
16) Lack of Conviction, The Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur, June 8, 2006 
17) Darfur 2007: Chaos by Design, Peacekeeping Challenges for AMIS and UNAMID, 
September 19, 2007 
18) Ten Steps for Darfur, Indicators for Evaluating Progress in the Human Rights Group of 
Experts Process, September 24, 2007 
19) Five Years On, No Justice for Sexual Violence in Darfur, April 6, 2008 
20) “They Shot at Us as We Fled,” Government Attacks on Civilians in West Darfur in 
February 2008, May 18, 2008 
21) The Way Forward, Ending Human Rights Abuses and Repression Across Sudan, October 
26, 2009 
22) Darfur in the Shadows, The Sudanese Government’s On-going Attacks on Civilians and 
Human Rights, June 5, 2011    
23) Unfinished Business, Closing Gaps in the Selection of ICC Cases, September 15, 2011 
 
List of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Darfur, Sudan: 
1) Resolution 1556, adopted on July 30, 2004, demanding Sudan to disarm Janjaweed militia 
and bring to justice the perpetrators of human rights and international humanitarian law 
violations committed in Darfur. 
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2) Resolution 1564, adopted on September 18, 2004, threatened the imposition of sanctions 
against Sudan if it failed to comply with its obligations on Darfur. The Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was invoked to establish an 
international inquiry to investigate human rights violations in the region.  
3) Resolution 1591, adopted on March 27, 2005, regarding the placing of travel ban and asset 
freeze on those impeding the peace process in Darfur. 
4) Resolution 1593, adopted on March 31, 2005, referring human rights atrocities in Darfur to 
the International Criminal Court. 
5) Resolution 1651, adopted on December 21, 2005, extending the mandate of an expert panel 
monitoring sanctions against and violations of human rights in Darfur. 
6) Resolution 1665, adopted on March 29, 2006, extending the mandate of panel of expert to 
monitor sanctions against and violations of human rights in Darfur. 
7) Resolution 1672, adopted on April 25, 2006, imposing travel and financial sanctions on 
four Sudanese individual over their involvement in the Darfur conflict: Sheikh Musa Hillal 
(Janjaweed leader), Major General Mohammed Elhassen (commander of Sudan’s western 
military region), Gabriel Abdul Kareen Badri (commander of National Movement for 
Reform and Development), and Adam Yacub Shant (head of Sudan Liberation 
Movement/Army). 
8) Resolution 1679, adopted on May 16, 2006, endorsing a decision by the African Union 
Peace and Security Council to transform peacekeeping operation in Darfur. 
9) Resolution 1706, adopted on August 31, 2006, expanding the United Nations Mission in 
Sudan (UNMIS) to include deployments in Darfur 
10) Resolution 1713, adopted on September 29, 2006, extending the mandate of panel of expert 
to monitor sanctions against and violations of human rights in Darfur. 
11) Resolution 1769, adopted on July 31, 2007, authorizing the deployment of African Union-
United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) 
12) Resolution 1779, adopted on September 28, 2007, extending the mandate of panel of expert 
to monitor sanctions against and violations of human rights in Darfur. 
13) Resolution 1812, adopted on April 30, 2008, regarding reports of the Secretary-General on 
the Sudan. 
14) Resolution 1828, adopted on July 31, 2008, regarding reports of the Secretary-General on 
the Sudan. 
15) Resolution 1841, adopted on October 15, 2008, regarding reports of the Secretary-General 
on the Sudan. 
16) Resolution 1881, adopted on July 30, 2009, extending the UNAMID mission until July 31, 
2010. 
17) Resolution 1891, adopted on October 31, 2009, extending the mandate of the panel of 
experts to monitor the arms embargo and sanctions until October 15, 2009 
18) Resolution 1935, adopted on July 30, 2010, extending the mandate of UNAMID mission.  
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19) Resolution 1945, adopted on October 14, 2010, extending the mandate of expert panel 
monitoring sanctions against groups in Darfur. 
20) Resolution 1982, adopted on May 17, 2011, extending the mandate of expert panel 
monitoring arms embargo and other sanctions against Sudan. 
21) Resolution 2003, adopted on July 29, 2011, extending the mandate of UNAMID mission.  
 
List of International Crisis Group Reports on the DRC: 
1) ICG Kivu Report No. 1, North Kivu, Into the Quagmire? An Overview of the Current 
Crisis in North Kivu, 13 August 1998 
2) ICG Congo Report No. 2, Congo at War, A Briefing on the Internal and External Players in 
the Central African Conflict, 17 November 1998  
3) ICG Democratic Republic of Congo Report No. 3, How Kabila Lost His Way: The 
Performance of Laurent Désiré Kabila’s Government, 21 May 1999  
4) ICG Democratic Republic of Congo Report No. 4, Africa’s Seven-Nation War, 21 May 
1999 
5) ICG Democratic Republic of Congo Report No. 5, The Agreement on A Cease-fire in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace, 20 
August 1999 
6)  ICG Africa Report No. 26, Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of An Ugly War, 20 
December 2000 
7) ICG Africa Report No. 27, From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo, 16 
March 2001 
8) ICG Africa Briefing Paper, Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in Conflict Prevention, 12 
June 2001 
9) ICG Africa Report No. 27, The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: Political Negotiation or Game of 
Bluff?, 16 November 2001 
10) ICG Africa Report No. 38, Disarmament in the Congo: Jump-Starting DDRRR to Prevent 
Further War, 14 December 2001 
11) ICG Africa Report No. 44, Storm Clouds Over Sun City: The Urgent Need to Recast the 
Congolese Peace Process, 14 May 2002 
12) ICG Africa Report No. 56, The Kivus: The Forgotten Crucible of the Congo Conflict, 24 
January 2003 
13) ICG Africa Report No. 64, Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri, 13 June 2003 
14) ICG Africa Briefing, Pulling Back from the Brink in the Congo, 7 July 2004 
15) ICG Africa Report No. 84, Maintaining Momentum in the Congo: The Ituri Problem, 26 
August 2004 
16) Crisis Group Africa Briefing, Back to the Brink in Congo, 17 December 2004 
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17) Crisis Group Africa Report No. 91, The Congo’s Transition is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus, 
30 March 2005 
18) Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 25, The Congo: Solving the FDLR Problem Once and for 
All, 12 May 2005 
19) Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 34, A Congo Action Plan, 19 October 2005 
20) Crisis Group Africa Report No. 103, Katanga: The Congo’s Forgotten Crisis, 9 January 
2006 
21) Crisis Group Africa Report No. 104, Security Sector Reform in the Congo, 13 February 
2006 
22) Crisis Group Africa Report No. 108, Congo’s Election: Making or Breaking the Peace, 27 
April 2006 
23) Crisis Group Africa Report No. 114, Escaping the Conflict Trap: Promoting Good 
Governance in the Congo, 20 July 2006 
24) Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 42, Securing Congo’s Elections: Lessons from the 
Kinshasa Showdown, 2 October 2006 
25) Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 44, Congo: Staying Engaged after the Elections, 9 
January 2007 
26) Crisis Group Africa Report No. 128, Congo: Consolidating the Peace, 5 July 2007 
27) Crisis Group Africa Report No. 133, Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu, 31 October 
2007 
28) Crisis Group Africa Report No. 140, Congo: Four Priorities for Sustainable Peace in Ituri, 
13 May 2008 
29) Crisis Group Africa Report No. 150, Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy, 11 
May 2009 
30) Crisis Group Africa Report No. 151, Congo: A Comprehensive Strategy to Disarm the 
FDLR, 9 July 2009 
31) Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 73, Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda, 8 April 2010 
32) Crisis Group Africa Report No. 165, Congo: No Stability in Kivu Despite a Rapprochement 
with Rwanda, 16 November 2010 
33) Crisis Group Africa Report No. 175, Congo: The Electoral Dilemma, 5 May 2011 
34) Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 80, Congo: The Electoral Process Seen from the East, 5 
September 2011  
 
List of Human Rights Watch Reports on the DRC: 
1) “Attacked by All Sides,” Civilians and the War in Eastern Zaire, March 1, 1997 
2) Transition, War and Human Rights, April 1, 1997 
3) What Kabila is Hiding, Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo, October 1, 1997 
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4) Transition and Human Rights Violations in Congo, December 1, 1997 
5) Casualties of War, Civilians, Rule of Law and Democratic Freedoms, February 1, 1999 
6) Eastern Congo Ravaged: Killing Civilians and Silencing Protest, May 1, 2000 
7) Background to the Hema-Lendu Conflict in Uganda-Controlled Congo, January 31, 2001 
8) Uganda in Eastern DRC, Fuelling Political and Ethnic Strife, March 1, 2001 
9) Reluctant Recruits, Children and Adults Forcibly Recruited for Military Service in North 
Kivu, May 1, 2001 
10) Attacks on Civilians in Ugandan Occupied Areas in Northeastern Congo, February 13, 
2002 
11) A Briefing Paper for the “Arria Formula” Meeting on the Situation in the DRC, April 25, 
2002 
12) The War Within the War, Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo, June 
20, 2002 
13) War Crimes in Kisangani, The Response of Rwanda-backed Rebels to the May 2002 
Mutiny, August 20, 2002 
14) Chaos in Eastern Congo: UN Action Need Now, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper 
October 31, 2002 
15) Covered in Blood, Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern DRC, July 7, 2003 
16) Policy Paralysis, A Call for Action on HIV/AIDS-Related Human Rights Abuses against 
Women and Girls in Africa, December 1, 2003 
17) DR Congo: Briefing to the 60th Session of the UN Commission on the Human Rights, 
January 29, 2004 
18) Child Soldier Use 2003, A Briefing for the 4th UN Security Council Open Debate on 
Children and Armed Conflict, January 29, 2004 
19) Democratic Republic of the Congo: Confronting Impunity, February 2, 2004 
20) DR Congo: War Crimes in Bukavu, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper June 2004, June 
12, 2004 
21) Making Justice Work: Restoration of the Legal System in Ituri, DRC, September 1, 2004 
22) Burundi: The Gatumba Massacre, War Crimes and Political Agendas, September 7, 2004 
23) Democratic Republic of Congo: Civilians at Risk During Disarmament Operations, 
December 29, 2004 
24) Seeking Justice, The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in the Congo War, March 7, 2005 
25) The Curse of Gold, June 1, 2005 
26) Submission to the 38th Ordinary Session of the Africa Commission on Human and People’s 
Rights, Banjul, Gambia, November 19, 2005 
27) Elections in Sight, “Don’t Rock the Boat,” December 15, 2005 
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28) What Future? Street Children in the Democratic Republic of Congo, April 4, 2006 
29) UPC Crimes in Ituri (2002-2003), November 8, 2006 
30) Statement to the DRC Parliamentary Commission Investigating Events in Bas Congo, April 
12, 2007 
31) Down to Business, The Human Rights Council’s Backlog of Work, September 10, 2007 
32) Renewed Crisis in North Kivu, October 23, 2007 
33) “We Will Crush You,” The Restriction of Political Space in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, November 25, 2008 
34) The Killing in Kiwanja, The UN’s Inability to Protect Civilians, December 12, 2008 
35) The Christmas Massacres, LRA Attacks on Civilians in Northern Congo, February 16, 2009 
36) Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone, Sexual Violence and Military Reform in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, July 16, 2009 
37) “You Will Be Punished,” Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo, December 13, 2009 
38) Trail of Death, LRA Atrocities in Northeastern Congo, March 28, 2010 
39) Always on the Run, The Vicious Cycle of Displacement in Eastern Congo, September 14, 
2010 
40) Unfinished Business, Closing Gaps in the Selection of ICC Cases, September 15, 2011  
 
List of UN Panel of Experts Reports: 
1) Interim Report of the United Nations Expert Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural 
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
S/2001/49, 16 January 2001 
2) Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2001/357, 12 April 2001 
3) Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural 
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
S/2001/1072, 13 November 2001 
4) Interim report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and 
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/565, 22 May 
2002 
5) Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and 
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1146, 16 October 
2002 
6) Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and 
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2003/1027, 23 October 
2003 
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7) Addendum to the Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural 
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
S/2003/1027/Add.1, 23 October 2003 
 
List of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on the DRC:  
1) Resolution 1234, adopted on April 9, 1999, regarding war in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. The Security Council demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities in the 
region, a withdrawal of foreign troops, and the re-establishment of the government’s 
authority.  
2) Resolution 1258, adopted on August 6, 1999, regarding the deployment of military liaison 
personnel in the DRC to observe and report on the compliance on factions with the peace 
accords.  
3) Resolution 1273, adopted on November 5, 1999, regarding the extension of military liaison 
personnel’s mandate in the DRC. 
4) Resolution 1279, adopted on November 30, 1999, regarding the establishment of United 
Missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). 
5) Resolution 1291, adopted on February 24, 2000, regarding the extension and the expansion 
of MONUC’s mandate. 
6) Resolution 1304, adopted on June 16, 2000, demanding the cessation of hostilities in the 
Second Congo War among Congolese, Rwandan and Ugandan forces. 
7) Resolution 1323, adopted on October 2000, extending MONUC’s mandate. 
8) Resolution 1332, adopted on December 14, 2000, extending MONUC’s mandate. 
9) Resolution 1341, adopted on February 21, 2001, demanding the disengagement and 
withdrawal plans of foreign troops in the DRC. 
10) Resolution 1355, adopted on June 15, 2001, extending MONUC’s mandate. 
11) Resolution 1361, adopted on August 23, 2000, extending MONUC’s mandate.  
12) Resolution 1376, adopted on November 9, 2001, launching the third phase of MONUC’s 
deployment. 
13) Resolution 1417, adopted on June 17, 2002, extending MONUC’s mandate. 
14) Resolution 1445, adopted on December 4, 2002, expanding MONUC’s mandate. 
15) Resolution 1457, adopted on January 24, 2003, condemning illegal exploitation of natural 
resources in the DRC and requesting a six-month mandate for a panel of experts to 
investigate the issue.  
16) Resolution 1468, adopted on March 20, 2003, welcoming the agreement for establishing a 
transitional government in the DRC. 
17) Resolution 1484, adopted on May 30, 2003, authorizing Operation Artemis in Bunia, DRC. 
18) Resolution 1489, adopted on June 26, 2003, extending MONUC’s mandate. 
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19) Resolution 1493, adopted on July 28, 2003, extending MONUC’s mandate. 
20) Resolution 1499, adopted on August 13, 2003, extending the mandate of panel of experts to 
monitor exploitation of natural resources in the DRC. 
21) Resolution 1501, adopted on August 26, 2003, authorizing multinational force in eastern 
DRC to assist MONUC.  
22) Resolution 1522, adopted on January 15, 2004, regarding the integration and restructuring 
of armed forces in the DRC. 
23) Resolution 1533, adopted on March 12, 2004, strengthening arms embargo against the 
armed groups in eastern DRC. 
24) Resolution 1552, adopted on July 27, 2004, extending arms embargo. 
25) Resolution 1555, adopted on July 29, 2004, extending MONUC’s mandate. 
26) Resolution 1565, adopted on October 1, 2004, extending and strengthening MONUC’s 
mandate. 
27) Resolution 1592, adopted on March 30, 2005, extending MONUC’s mandate. 
28) Resolution 1596, adopted on April 18, 2005, widening arms embargo. 
29) Resolution 1616, adopted on July 29, 2005, renewal of arms embargo. 
30) Resolution 1621, adopted on September 6, 2005, increasing MONUC’s strength.  
31) Resolution 1628, adopted on September 30, 2005, extending MONUC’s mandate. 
32) Resolution 1635, adopted on October 28, 2005, extending MONUC’s mandate. 
33) Resolution 1649, adopted on December 21, 2005, renewal of arms embargo, financial and 
travel sanctions against the DRC. 
34) Resolution 1654, adopted on January 31, 2006, re-establishment of panel monitoring arms 
embargo. 
35) Resolution 1669, adopted on April 10, 2006, redeployment of personnel from UN 
Operations in Burundi to support MONUC.  
36) Resolution 1671, adopted on April 25, 2006, authorizing the deployment of EUFOR RD 
Congo. 
37) Resolution 1693, adopted June 30, 2006, increasing the size of MONUC.  
38) Resolution 1698, adopted July 31, 2006, extending mandate of panel of experts to monitor 
the arms embargo. 
39) Resolution 1711, adopted September 29, 2006, extending MONUC’s mandate. 
40) Resolution 1736, adopted on December 22, 2006, increasing the strength of MONUC. 
41) Resolution 1742, adopted on February 15, 2007, extending MONUC’s mandate. 
42) Resolution 1751, adopted on April 13, 2007, extending MONUC’s mandate. 
43) Resolution 1756, adopted on May 15, 2007, extending MONUC’s mandate. 
44) Resolution 1768, adopted on July 31, 2007, extending arms embargo. 
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45) Resolution 1771, adopted on August 10, 2007, renewal of arms embargo. 
46) Resolution 1794, adopted on December 21, 2007, extending MONUC’s mandate. 
47) Resolution 1797, adopted on January 30, 2008, authorizing MONUC to organize and 
conduct local election. 
48) Resolution 1799, adopted on February 15, 2008, renewal sanctions against DRC. 
49) Resolution 1804, adopted on March 13, 2008, concerning the situation in Great Lakes 
Region. 
50) Resolution 1807, adopted on March 31, 2008, concerning the situation in DRC. 
51) Resolution 1843, adopted on November 20, 2008, concerning the conflict in Kivu. 
52) Resolution 1856 and Resolution 1857, adopted on December 2008, concerning the situation 
in DRC. 
53) Resolution 1896, adopted on November 30, 2009, extending the mandate of the committee 
established pursuant to Resolution 1553 (2004) and extension of measures on arms, 
transport, financial and travel against the DRC imposed by Resolution 1807 (2008).  
54) Resolution 1906, adopted on December 23, 2009, extending MONUC’s mandate. 
55) Resolution 1925, adopted on May 28, 2010, extending MONUC’s mandate until June 30, 
2010, authorizing the withdrawal of 2,000 troops and the transformation of MONUC to the 
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (MONUSCO) on July 1, 2010.  
56) Resolution 1952, adopted on November 29, 2010, extending arms embargo and other 
sanctions against the DRC.   
57) Resolution 1991, adopted on June 28, 2011, extending the mandate of the MONUSCO.  
 
 
 
